



Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security

Network and Security Research Center
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Pennsylvania State University, University Park PA

(Integrity Justified) Experimental Provenance

Patrick McDaniel, Pennsylvania State University
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
Provenance

- A human scale problem:
 - ▶ Data often comes from many sources ...
 - ▶ ... is synthesized/influenced by complex/hidden processes ...
 - ▶ ... thus, how do you really know what the data means?
- *Data provenance* immutably identifies how data came to be in the state it is.
 - ▶ **Who/what** contributed to it?
 - ▶ **What** was it based on?
 - ▶ **When** was it generated?
 - ▶ **Why** was it generated?
 - ▶ **How** was it generated?



Why GENI provenance?

- Error handling
 - ▶ Detection, isolation, and recovery
- Source attribution
 - ▶ Forensics, consistency, believability
- Experimental Reproducibility
 - ▶ Extension, instrumentation
- Data revision
 - ▶ Updates, correction, extension, refinement
- Evidentiary
 - ▶ Evidence that data is legitimate/legal (certification, verification)
- *Experimental data can only be judged in light of how, when and where it comes from*



GENI System Provenance

- Assessing system provenance is key to understanding achieving the goals of GENI
 - ▶ What software was a component (slice/aggregate) running?
 - ▶ What inputs and configuration were used?
 - ▶ What security policy was being enforced?
 - e.g., isolation, data protection, privacy
- Stated as experimental *criteria* during the setup/acceptance
 - ▶ Think about sensitive experiments: *NCR*-esque, proprietary algorithms, opt-in with personal information
 - ▶ Determines apparatus acceptability of validation

GENI adoption requires answers to these questions

Integrity Justified Provenance

- Integrity measurement techniques provide information about the instantaneous state of a system, but *not* its data, or over time, or for other computational elements (VMs)
- What if you could build an aggregate of mutually attesting components that uses that apparatus to attest to the system state, protection state, data, and environment.
 - ▶ ... and tie a proof of that aggregate to experimental results.
- Building on the shared reference monitor (Shamon)

