The Design of GrIDS:
A Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System

Steven Cheung, Rick Crawford, Mark Dilger,
Jeremy Frank, Jim Hoagland, Karl Levitt, Jeff Rowe
Stuart Staniford-Chen, Raymond Yip, Dan Zerkle

Department of Computer Science,
University of California at Davis,
Davis, CA 95616

January 26, 1999
Abstract

This report documents the design of the Graph-based Intrusion Detection System (GrIDS) in reasonable detail. It is intended as a guide to people who wish to understand the implementation, or who have more detailed questions about the design than are addressed elsewhere.

GrIDS is a prototype intrusion detection system that was designed to explore the issues involved in doing large scale aggregation of traffic patterns. It features a hierarchical decomposition of the protected organization and its networks. GrIDS puts together reports of incidents and network traffic into graphs, and is able to aggregate those graphs into simpler forms at higher levels of the hierarchy.

The prototype was implemented in Perl, by the authors, mainly during 1996. The prototype is usable, and has been run extensively on our network, but does not have the security and fault-tolerance features that would be needed for production use.
Contents

1 Overview of GrIDS .......................................................... 5
  1.0 Types of Network Attack ............................................. 5
  1.1 GrIDS—Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System .............. 5
     1.1.1 A Simple Example ........................................... 5
     1.1.2 Graph Building ............................................. 6
     1.1.3 Aggregation ................................................ 6
     1.1.4 Limitations ................................................. 7
     1.1.5 Organization ............................................... 7

2 The Graph Building Engine ............................................. 8
  2.1 Introduction ....................................................... 8
     2.1.1 Goals ....................................................... 8
     2.1.2 Overview .................................................. 8
  2.2 Graphs ............................................................. 8
  2.3 Graph Engine Rules ............................................... 8
     2.3.1 Rulesets .................................................... 9
     2.3.2 An Overview of How the Rules Work .................... 9
     2.3.3 Graph Rules—A Simple Example ......................... 11
     2.3.4 Auto-Computed Attributes ............................... 12
     2.3.5 Rule Primitives ........................................... 12
     2.3.6 Importing Functions into the Graph Rules ............ 13
     2.3.7 Rule Grammar ............................................ 13
  2.4 Aggregation of Graphs ............................................. 14
     2.4.1 Introduction to Aggregation ............................... 14
     2.4.2 Aggregating Attributes ................................... 15
     2.4.3 When Reports Are Sent to the Parent Engine .......... 15
     2.4.4 Graph Aggregation Details .............................. 16
     2.4.5 Graph Aggregation Example ............................. 17
  2.5 Buffers ............................................................. 17
  2.6 Alerts .............................................................. 18
  2.7 Query language .................................................... 19
  2.8 Controlling the Graph Engine ................................... 19

3 Communication amongst Components ................................ 20
  3.1 How GrIDS components communicate ........................... 20
  3.2 The Message API .................................................. 20
  3.3 The Graph Language .............................................. 21
     3.3.1 Labeling Nodes and Edges ............................... 21
     3.3.2 Reports Containing a Connection ....................... 21
     3.3.3 Reports Containing a Host .............................. 22
     3.3.4 Reports Containing a Graph ............................ 22
     3.3.5 Representing Attributes on Nodes, Edges and Graphs .... 22
     3.3.6 Quoting in the Graph Language ....................... 22
     3.3.7 Graph Grammar ........................................... 23
4 The Organizational Hierarchy

4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 24
4.2 An example .................................................................................................................................................. 24
4.3 The Organizational Hierarchy Server ....................................................................................................... 25
4.4 Organizational Hierarchy Messages
   4.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 26
   4.4.2 Transaction Types .................................................................................................................................. 26
4.5 The View Serial Number Mechanism ......................................................................................................... 29

5 Modules and the Module Controller .............................................................................................................. 30

5.1 Communication with User Interface ......................................................................................................... 30
   5.1.1 Control Variables .................................................................................................................................. 30
   5.1.2 Module Controller ................................................................................................................................. 30
   5.1.3 Protocol .................................................................................................................................................. 30
   5.1.4 Special Aliases & Subcommands to Module Controller ......................................................................... 32
5.2 Library Functions ......................................................................................................................................... 33
5.3 Detailed Design of Module Controller
   5.3.1 Startup and Trust Issues for Module Controllers ................................................................................ 33
   5.3.2 Special Files for Module Controller ................................................................................................... 33
   5.3.3 Machine Access Control ...................................................................................................................... 34
   5.3.4 Access Control for Special Modules .................................................................................................. 34
   5.3.5 Module Controllers Should Use Standard Port .................................................................................. 34
   5.3.6 Deleting Hosts Running Critical Modules ......................................................................................... 35
   5.3.7 What Software is Executing? .............................................................................................................. 35
5.4 Special Case: GrIDS Data Sources
   5.4.1 Data Source Control ............................................................................................................................. 35
   5.4.2 Data Source To Aggregator Communication ..................................................................................... 35
5.5 Initialization of Modules .............................................................................................................................. 35

6 Control of Software ...................................................................................................................................... 37

6.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................................... 37
6.2 Software Managers ..................................................................................................................................... 37
6.3 Access Control
   6.3.1 User Access Control ............................................................................................................................. 37
   6.3.2 Machine Access Control ..................................................................................................................... 38
6.4 Trust Issues for Software Managers ......................................................................................................... 38
6.5 Trust Issues for Module Controllers ........................................................................................................ 39
6.6 IMPLICATIONS for GET/SET FORMAT ............................................................................................... 40
6.7 IMPLICATIONS for Ruleset Updating ...................................................................................................... 40
6.8 Deleting Hosts Running Critical Modules ................................................................................................. 41
6.9 Software Control Protocol
   6.9.1 Set Host Variable (header shv) ........................................................................................................... 41
   6.9.2 Get Host Variable (header ghv) ........................................................................................................... 41
   6.9.3 Set Dept Variable (header sdv) ........................................................................................................... 41
   6.9.4 Get Dept Variable (header gdv) .......................................................................................................... 42

7 The Network Monitor .................................................................................................................................... 43

7.1 Assumptions and Design Objectives .......................................................................................................... 43
7.2 Events ......................................................................................................................................................... 43
7.3 What to sniff for
   7.3.1 TELNET ............................................................................................................................................ 44
   7.3.2 NFS .................................................................................................................................................... 44
7.4 Sniffer Control Messages ............................................................................................................................ 45
   7.4.1 Start Up and Shut Down ...................................................................................................................... 46
# List of Figures

1.1 The beginning of a worm graph .................................................. 6
1.2 A more extensive view of the same worm. ..................................... 6
1.3 A graph amongst several departments. The dashed lines are departmental boundaries. .................................................. 7
1.4 The corresponding reduced graph. ................................................. 7

2.1 Two machines connecting in the production department .................... 14
2.2 Connection from production to management. ................................... 14
2.3 The production department graph engine’s view of the same situation. . 14
2.4 The view according to the engine for Acme Inc. ............................... 14
2.5 Connection between ACME and Widgets. ....................................... 15
2.6 View at .com domain . ............................................................... 15
2.7 ACME view of connection to Widgets. .......................................... 15
2.8 Graph Spaces At Host Level ....................................................... 16
2.9 Graph Spaces At Aggregated Level .............................................. 16
2.10 Example graph aggregation attribute path (time 1) .......................... 17
2.11 Example graph aggregation attribute path (time 2) .......................... 17
2.12 Example graph aggregation attribute path (time 3) .......................... 17
2.13 Example graph aggregation attribute path (time 4) .......................... 18
2.14 Connection between host a in department A and host b in department B 18

4.1 An example hierarchy. Department G is about to be moved from under department E to under department D. An interface and the organizational hierarchy server are also shown. .................. 24

5.1 Operation of the GrIDS Module Controller ................................. 31
5.2 Data flow through data source modules ....................................... 35

7.1 UDP sessions. ................................................................. 44
List of Tables

3.1 Allowable headers in GrIDS packets ................................................................. 20
7.1 TELNET events. ................................................................................................. 44
7.2 NFS events. ........................................................................................................ 45
Chapter 1

Overview of GrIDS

1.0.1 Types of Network Attack

Here we discuss examples of attacks which have interesting large scale structure which GrIDS can detect.

A sweep involves a single host systematically contacting many others in succession. Doorknob rattling is a sweep attack that checks for poorly secured or configured hosts, (e.g. checking for weak or default passwords). The Security Administrator’s Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN) [1] is an example of a publicly available sweeping tool that scans for vulnerabilities. There are legitimate reasons for sweep activity (SNMP polling, centralized backups). However, legitimate sweeps tend to be highly circumscribed and regular in their nature: the source host, services used, hosts contacted, and time of day may all be predictable.

Coordinated attacks are multi-step exploitations using parallel sessions where the division of steps between sessions is designed to obscure the unified nature of the attack or to allow the attack to proceed more quickly. A simple example is several simultaneous sweep attacks from multiple sources. In another example, one user makes some high visibility attacks on a set of military computers as a diversion while another attacker breaks into one of the hosts and installs Trojan horse software. The combined nature of the attack can be apparent if the actual source of the attack is traced back to the same person, or if features of the attacks are similar. To make this inference, a mechanism must exist to correlate sessions across several hosts.

Seely defines a worm as “a program that propagates itself across a network using resources on one machine to attack other machines” [2]. The best known worm attack is the Morris worm of 1988 which infected thousands of hosts throughout the Internet, rendering them unusable. Worms are evidenced by a large amount of traffic forming a tree-like pattern and by similar activity occurring on hosts within this tree. Intrusion detection systems may detect a worm by analyzing the pattern of spread. It would be difficult to note the presence of a worm simply by looking at a single host since the larger, widespread nature of the attack would not be apparent.

1.1 GrIDS—Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System

We now present the design of GrIDS. We begin with a very simplified version, and then explain more details.

1.1.1 A Simple Example

GrIDS constructs graphs which represent hosts and activity in a network. Let us take the tracking of a worm as an example of building such an activity graph. In Figure 1.1, the worm begins on host $A$, then initiates connections to hosts $B$ and $C$ which cause them to be infected. The two connections are reported to a GrIDS module, which creates a new graph representing this activity and records when it occurred. If enough time passes without further activity from hosts $A$, $B$, or $C$, then the graph will be forgotten. However, if the worm spreads quickly to hosts $D$ and $E$, as in the figure, then this new activity is added to the graph and the graph’s time stamp is updated. This simple procedure assumes that activities between machines are related if they occur closely together in time. Further activity by the worm results in an even larger graph, as in Figure 1.2. In general, when a worm infects a network protected by GrIDS, the fanning, tree-like structure of the worm’s propagation will cause GrIDS to build a fanning, tree-like graph. GrIDS evaluates this graph pattern as a suspected worm. This evaluation can be performed, for example, by counting the number of nodes and branches in the graph. Counts over a threshold provoke GrIDS to report a suspected worm.

Similarly, network sweeps and other patterns of abuse produce graphs of a certain shape, and GrIDS may be configured to detect and report them.

In verifying our design concept, we built a basic implementation of this algorithm (which we christened Early Bird). We ran this code for several weeks on our LAN with TCP-wrapper data as input. We had no difficulty in tuning the software to detect a worm or sweep attack within seconds but produce only one or two false alarms per day. Fuller results of evaluations of GrIDS will appear elsewhere.
1.1.2 Graph Building

In the worm example of the last section, we detected the worm based solely on the tree-like structure of the graph, and the nodes and edges of the graph were included based purely on time coincidence. GrIDS uses other information to determine if network activities are related, such as whether the traffic used the same destination ports or went to hosts of similar operating systems. In addition to forming graphs from network traffic reports, GrIDS allows the nodes and edges to be annotated with attributes. These provide supplementary information about the node (host) or edge (traffic) in question. Hence, GrIDS is able to detect worms based on events at the hosts and properties of the traffic, in addition to the shape of the graph. For example, if GrIDS were looking for a particular kind of worm, one that transmitted password files between hosts, then a worm-shaped graph would not be reported until one or more of the links were annotated as transmitting a password file.

Node and edge attributes may come from other IDSs, network sniffers, or any monitor that is equipped with a filter to send its output to GrIDS. A well defined syntax for reporting to GrIDS is available to GrIDS users who wish to write their own filters. The GrIDS mechanisms make no specific assumptions about the nature of attributes, and GrIDS is able to import externally written correlation functions. This allows users to put the general GrIDS mechanism to work in many different ways. For example, thumbprinting [3] mechanisms could be straightforwardly added in this manner. This would allow GrIDS to trace intruders through multiple connections.

Because GrIDS searches for numerous types of network abuse, it needs to build numerous kinds of graphs. A single graph containing all network activity would be too awkward to analyze effectively. GrIDS maintains multiple graph spaces, where each graph space contains a number of graphs of a single type. The “type” of graph represented is determined by a set of rules which specify how graphs in that space are built. Each graph space has its own such rule set. A rule set only modifies the graphs in its own space, and has no effect in other graph spaces.

When new node or link information is received by GrIDS, the information is presented to each rule set, which determines whether and how the information is incorporated into graphs in the corresponding space. If the information is relevant to that rule set, it may be added to one or more existing graphs, cause multiple existing graphs to coalesce into a single graph, or be used to create a new graph. After such a change occurs in a graph space, the graphs in that space are analyzed according to certain rules in the rule set to determine if they are suspicious. If so, predetermined actions are taken, such as reporting the graph to the SSO. GrIDS will provide an interface for displaying such alerts.

1.1.3 Aggregation

GrIDS models an organization as a hierarchy of departments. In order to manage this, it provides a drag and drop interface which allows the hierarchy to be reconfigured during operation. Each department in the hierarchy has a GrIDS module of its own, which builds and evaluates graphs of activity within that department. However, activity which crosses departmental boundaries is passed up to the next level in the hierarchy for resolution. That level will build reduced graphs in which the nodes are entire subdepartments rather than single hosts. More complex features of the full graph can be preserved in the reduced graph by use of attributes.

For example, consider the graph in Figure 1.3, which crosses several departmental boundaries. This graph might well be cause for suspicion taken as a whole. However, the graph is not particularly suspicious in any one department.

At the next level in the departmental hierarchy, the reduced graph (shown in Figure 1.4) will be seen. This graph is not suspicious just by nature of its topology. However, attributes of the individual subgraphs are passed up which allow the higher level module to draw stronger conclusions about the graph. For a simple example, each sub-department passes up the size of the subgraph it sees. Thus GrIDS can deduce that the total graph has ten hosts in it. Similarly, the number of branches and the depth of the graph can be computed. This will be enough to render the graph suspicious.

Using this approach, GrIDS is able to infer the suspicious nature of large graphs, while still reducing drastically the amount of information which must be considered at the top of the hierarchy. It is this that makes GrIDS a scalable design.

Figure 1.3: A more extensive view of the same worm.
a finished system appropriate for immediate deployment in mission-critical environments. Hence, we do not ensure the integrity of communications between GrIDS modules, nor is anything done to prevent an attacker from replacing parts of GrIDS with malicious software of her own. The prototype is not resistant to denial of service attacks, disruptions of the network time protocol, or faults in the networks or computers on which it runs.

The limitations above could be straightforwardly addressed in future versions of the system. A more fundamental limitation of GrIDS is that it is oriented towards detecting large scale attacks or violations of an explicit policy. It may not detect intrusions which are small, slow, or both. If other, local, IDS systems are installed, GrIDS can be used to present and manage their conclusions, but it will not detect all intrusions itself. We like to think of GrIDS as radar. It is still possible for intruders to fly under the radar; however, it makes the intruder’s task that much more difficult.

1.1.5 Organization

We now discuss the organization of the rest of this report. Chapter 2 discusses the way in which GrIDS graph engines build graphs, and the way in which the user can modify this process by specifying rulesets and adding new functions into the engine.

Chapter 3 covers the basic format for all GrIDS inter-component messages, and then discusses the way in which graphs are described in transit from one component to another.

Chapter 4 describes how the organizational hierarchy is stored and maintained, and how it is changed by transactions.

Chapter 5 considers the way in which software in GrIDS is divided into modules, and discusses the module controller which is responsible for starting, stopping, and configuring modules.

Chapter 6 discusses how modules are started and stopped through the hierarchy of software managers.

Chapter 7 describes the GrIDS network monitor.

We also use the hierarchy to manage the rule sets. A rule set is specified at a particular node, and all the descendants of that node must implement that rule set. Other parts of the hierarchy will not share it. This eliminates potential ambiguity between similar rules in different parts of the network.

1.1.4 Limitations

GrIDS tackles some of the hard issues which need to be faced for an intrusion detection system to operate on a large network. A lot of our effort has into making the aggregation mechanism scalable, and allowing the system to be dynamically configurable so that it is still manageable when deployed on a large scale.

Nonetheless, we should be clear that the current version of GrIDS is intended as a proof of concept rather than as
Chapter 2

The Graph Building Engine

2.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the GrIDS graph engine. This is the piece of software which takes basic activity reports and converts them into graphs. We first cover the purpose of the engine, then discuss its operation in detail.

2.1.1 Goals

The overall purposes of the graph engine are to build graphs of network activity and analyze them to see if they are suspicious. More specifically, the goals which we wish to achieve by building these graphs include:

- To detect worms and sweeps.
- To detect network access policy violations.
- To trace the source of activities across the network.
- To add context to point detection reports.
- To provide the SSO with a comprehensible way to visualize the activities of particular users or hosts.

2.1.2 Overview

The graph engine is perhaps the most central piece of GrIDS. Its task is to take in reports of network activity, build graphs out of them, and report those graphs to other graph engines. There is a hierarchy of such engines (the administration of the hierarchy is described in more detail in chapter 4).

The graph engine has six inputs:

- Rules which describe how graphs should be built (section 2.3).
- Functions which can be loaded into the engine at runtime and then referred to in the rules (section 2.3.6).
- Reports of network activity and partial graphs in our graph description language (chapter 3).
- Messages from the organizational hierarchy server which instruct the engine on who it should report to, who is in its department, etc. (see chapter 4).
- Queries to see graphs matching a particular pattern (section 2.7).
- Messages controlling the nature of debugging information which is recorded.

It has four outputs:

- Reduced graphs of activity it has seen in its department (section 2.4).
- Full graphs of activity supplied in response to a query (section 2.7).
- Alerts sent to a user interface reporting suspicious graphs (section 2.6).
- Debugging logs.

The algorithms used by the engine are described in section 2.3.2. Also relevant is section 2.5 which describes initial sorting and consolidation of incoming reports.

2.2 Graphs

Graphs consist of nodes, edges, attributes of nodes, attributes of edges, and global attributes of the graph as a whole. All attributes consists of a pair \((name, value)\). Names are identifiers, while attribute values may either be scalars (in the Perl sense of being interchangeably strings, numbers, or logical values), sets of scalars, or ordered lists of scalars.

Reports to the graph engine are in the form of (parts of) graphs, and the output from the graph engine is also in the form of a graph. The language in which graphs are specified is detailed in Chapter 3.

2.3 Graph Engine Rules

The graph engine takes as input a set of rules which tell it how to build and analyze graphs. This section discusses the syntax and semantics of those rules.
2.3.1 Rulesets

Not all types of network activity are related enough to belong in the same graph. Independent graphs representing different kinds of behavior may be easier to analyze than a single graph containing several largely unrelated kinds of information.

For example, one user may wish to look for many telnet connections being generated from a single host, while another wishes to look for a series of logins from host to host. If both kinds of connections (and perhaps other kinds as well) are all contained in one graph, it will be difficult to detect the relevant patterns. If, however, one graph contains only telnet connections, and one contains only login connections, then the users merely need to look at the shape of their graphs to determine if their criteria have been met (because they know all edges in their graphs are of the type they are interested in.)

For this reason, the graph engine is capable of maintaining multiple graph spaces, where each graph space contains only graphs of one type. The “type” of graph is specified by the rules which dictate how graphs in the graph space are built. In the example above, one graph space would have rules that allowed only telnet connections to be added to its graphs, where another graph space would allow only login connections to enter its graphs.

The rules in different rule sets do not interact at all. Each operates on its own graphs and does not affect the graphs of other rulesets.

2.3.2 An Overview of How the Rules Work

Reports come in as partial graphs. For each ruleset, the graph engine maintains a set of existing graphs. In processing an incoming report, the task of the engine is to determine which graphs the incoming report should be combined with and how the attributes should be updated. The rules are used in several ways.

Firstly, there are preconditions for the ruleset. These determine whether the incoming report is of a type that is suitable to be incorporated into this ruleset at all. If not, that is the end of the application of the rules for this particular ruleset for the report. There are two kinds of preconditions, node preconditions which are applied at every node of the incoming report, and edge preconditions which are applied at every edge. If any node or edge passes the precondition, then the report as a whole is deemed to pass the precondition.

Provided the precondition is met, the partial graph gets developed into a full graph, with all the attributes associated thereof. How this transformation takes place is indicated by report rules, which dictate how the attributes of the graph, nodes, and edges should be created based on the attributes in the partial graph. Now that a full graph has been made from a report, the next step is to possibly combine this new graph with its peer graphs in the graph space.

An adjacency test is now applied between the new graph and each of the other graphs constructed by the ruleset. The incoming graph will only be considered for incorporation into graphs with which it has an overlap in at least one node or edge. It will not be incorporated into graphs with which it is wholly disjoint.

Next, there are conditions, which are used to determine whether an incoming graph should be combined with some particular existing graph with which it does have some overlap. If the report is an aggregated graph attribute report from a subdeparts engine, then the graphs with which to combine are determined as described in section 2.4. Otherwise rules in the ruleset are used. These rules are again specific to nodes or edges. They are applied on every node or edge of the incoming report. Assuming that at least one of these conditions evaluates to true, then the incoming report will be incorporated into that existing graph. If no edge or node condition is true, then the report will not be incorporated.

It may well be that the new graph can be incorporated with several incoming graphs. If so, then the report will automatically trigger those graphs and the new graph to combine in a pairwise manner. A set of rules are concerned with how to combine two graphs. The actual combining of nodes and edges can be handled automatically, but the recomputation of attributes is something which the user must specify; the engine does not know how to compute the user’s attributes. Firstly, there are rules which dictate how to combine global attributes of the two graphs. Then there are rules which depend on local attributes at the nodes and edges in the intersection of the graphs. The local rules may make modifications to the global attributes also, to account for global attributes which depend on the graph topology and which cannot be computed purely from global attributes of the combining graphs.

2.3.3 Graph Rules - A Simple Example

An example should serve to make the rule operation clearer. The rules consist of a series of rulesets one after another. We take the example of a ruleset which is intended just to detect worms by aggregating connections together which occur close together in time. It also includes any node reports which have an alert attribute if they fall in the appropriate time frame.

The first line of a ruleset simply specifies that the text of a new ruleset is beginning and what its name is. The second specifies what length of alpha-buffer to use for this particular ruleset. Here we have no buffer. The timeout line indicates how long to wait since the last addition to the graph before deleting the graph (providing no new additions are made).

```
ruleset worm_detector;

buffer 0;

timeout 600;
```

Next we specify some macros (some text to replace by some other text), which in this case are just constants.
 macros \{ L=30; \}

Next, there are report attribute declarations. These specify the nature of any attributes which are going to be referred to in the rules. In this case there will be time and alert attributes which are scalars. Any attributes which are not specified in the ruleset, but show up in reports anyway, will simply be ignored.

attribute declarations { 
  time scalar;
  alert scalar;
}

A report arrives in the form of part of a graph. The first thing that happens is that, for each ruleset, the report is examined to determine if it is appropriate to incorporate in that ruleset. For each node and edge in the incoming graph, an appropriate node or edge precondition is evaluated. If the precondition evaluates to true for any such node or edge, then the report will be processed further against this ruleset.

In this case, the node precondition looks like the following:

node precondition defined(new.node.time) && defined(new.node.alert);

The expression defined(new.node.time) && defined(new.node.alert) says that the incoming node must have a time attribute and an alert attribute in order for this condition to be true. Recall that GrIDS scalars are derived from those of Perl – they evaluate to true if they exist and are non-zero or non-empty strings and have an explicit “undefined” value if no value has been set. Thus an isolated node report will only be considered for incorporation into the graphs of this ruleset if it has both of these attributes defined. The syntax specifies that it is the attribute of the incoming node that is under consideration. In this case, there is no ambiguity (in fact the “new.” can be omitted), but that will not be true as we move along.

The precondition for edges to be considered is more lenient; they simply have to have a time attribute:

edge precondition defined(new.edge.time);

So, if an incoming report has any node or edge which satisfies the corresponding condition, then that report will be incorporated into the graphs for the ruleset in some manner, as determined by later rules.

First, however, reports must be made into graphs. The nodes and edges in the incoming reports appear in the resulting graph, but the attributes (except the auto-computed ones, see section 2.3.4) must be computed explicitly in the following rules. In these rules, new refers to attributes appearing on the report and res refers to attributes being computed for the graph, which is the default.

report global rules { 
  res.global.alerts = \{\};
  res.global.time = 0;
}

The “report global rules” are run first for a first cut at computing the global graph attributes. In this example, the alerts and time global attributes are initialized.

report node rules { 
  res.global.alerts = \{res.global.alerts, 
    new.node.alert\};
  res.node.alerts = \{new.node.alert\};
  res.global.time = max(res.global.time, 
    new.node.time\});
  res.node.time = new.node.time;
}

Next the node rules for making a report into a graph are run for each of the nodes in the incoming report in some order. This section has access to both the set of global attributes and the attributes on the report node and update the “res” global and the attributes on the corresponding node. The above rules combine any alert attributes of the node with the global alerts attribute, putting the result into the global alerts attribute; initialize the local alerts attribute; and does something like what was done for the alerts attribute for the time attribute, except that the maximum is kept around.

report edge rules { 
  res.global.alerts = \{res.global.alerts, 
    new.edge.alert\};
  res.edge.alerts = \{res.edge.alerts, 
    new.edge.alert\};
  res.global.time = max(res.global.time, 
    new.edge.time, new.source.time, new.dest.time\});
  res.edge.time = max(new.edge.time, 
    new.source.time, new.dest.time\});
}

These edge rules are like the above node rules except that they are executed for each edge rather than each node.

There are a number of complications to understand about the next parts of the rules. Two graphs are being considered for combination, and also the way that the attributes on two graphs will combine into a final graph is being specified. Graphs combine if they overlap in at least one node or edge and if the combine rules evaluate to true for any node or edge in the intersection of the graphs. Computations are only done with the global attributes, and with the nodes and edges that are in the overlap of two graphs.

The following three rule sections describe whether and how to combine two adjacent graphs and are similar in structure to report rules above. In the following rules, res refers to attributes being computed, while new refers to attributes appearing on one of the graphs, and cur refers to attributes
on the other graph. If none of \texttt{res}, \texttt{new}, or \texttt{cur} is mentioned, then the resulting graph is the one being referred to.

The first rules to appear specify how the global attributes of two graphs should combine. This will be a first effort at combination which can be modified by local rules further down.

\begin{verbatim}
global rules {
    res.global.alerts = \{new.global.alerts, cur.global.alerts\};
}
\end{verbatim}

This says that the final global \texttt{alerts} attribute for a graph will be the union of the existing \texttt{alerts} attribute for one graph, together with any global \texttt{alerts} attribute in the other graph. The notation \{ ... \} is a set constructor, where sets inside the constructor are flattened out. Set and list constructors are described in more detail in section 2.3.5.

Next we have the rules which specify how nodes combine. The order in which node and edge rules are evaluated is implementation dependent and should not be relied upon in writing rules.

\begin{verbatim}
node rules {
    res.node.combine =
        !empty(\{new.node.alerts, cur.node.alerts\}) \&
        abs(cur.node.time - new.node.time) < L;
    res.node.alerts = \{cur.node.alerts, new.node.alerts\};
    res.node.time = max((cur.node.time, new.node.time));
}
\end{verbatim}

The first rule shown concerns a special fictional attribute \texttt{combine}. The value of this attribute will not appear in the final graph, but rather is used in the computation of whether the graphs should be combined at all. If the \texttt{combine} attribute evaluates to true on any overlapping node or edge in the graphs, then the graphs will in fact be coalesced. In the particular case above, the condition for the graphs to combine based on a particular node is basically that one of the nodes has a non-empty \texttt{alerts} attributes, and that the time attribute on the one node and the time attribute on the other node are sufficiently close together (where sufficiently is here defined by \texttt{L} which was earlier set to 30 seconds in a macro – all Grids times are in seconds).

The remaining node rules specify, assuming that the graphs are to combine at all, how attributes at nodes will combine. For example, the \texttt{alerts} attribute at a node in the final graph will be the union of the \texttt{alerts} attributes for the nodes and the \texttt{time} attribute will be the latest of the \texttt{time} attribute on the nodes. Not that “res.global” attributes could have been updated in these rules if the rule writer so desired.

Now, we have a set of edge rules which have a similar function as the node rules.

\begin{verbatim}
edge rules {
    res.edge.combine = abs(source.cur.time - new.edge.time) < L;
}
\end{verbatim}

This first edge rule is the one that dictates whether combination should be triggered by this rule or not. In this case, the condition applied is that the \texttt{time} attribute on the incoming edge must be sufficiently close to the \texttt{time} attribute on the node which is the source of this particular edge in the existing graph.

The remaining edge rules determine the value of local and global attributes. These are all similar in nature to the node attribute rules described above.

\begin{verbatim}
edge rules {
    res.edge.alerts = \{cur.edge.alerts, new.edge.alerts\};
    res.edge.time = max((cur.edge.time, new.edge.time));
}
\end{verbatim}

Finally, we have the assessment rules which evaluate the resulting graph and take appropriate actions. The resulting graph attributes may be referred to as “res” or without such a prefix. Assessment rules may only refer to global attributes. The actions on the right hand side can either be calls to built-in or user defined functions or assignments to global attributes. The alert function sends some text as an alert to the user interfaces monitoring the engine and the report function sends some text and the current graph to the user interfaces. The numeric argument to these functions is an alert level. This is described in more detail in section 2.6.

\begin{verbatim}
assessments {
    !empty(global.alerts) ==>
        report_graph(2,"alerts found!");
    global.nnodes > 7 ==>
        report_graph(3, global.nnodes:" nodes in graph");
    global.nedges > 12 ==>
        report_graph(2, global.nedges:" edges in graph");
    global.nnodes > 3 ==>
        report_graph(2, global.nnodes:" nodes in graph");
    global.nnodes > 5 ==>
        report_graph(2, global.nnodes:" nodes in graph");
}
\end{verbatim}

The point worthy of note here is that a number of attributes are being referred to which the earlier rules did not compute. These are automatically computed attributes, which can be referred to by the rules, but not assigned to. More detail on these attributes can be found in section 2.3.4.

2.3.4 Auto-Computed Attributes

The following attributes are computed automatically by the engine. They may be referred to by the rule writer, but are not computed explicitly by the rules.

- **Global Attributes**

  - \texttt{gids}, a set of graph ids associated with this graph, any of which can be used as a unique identifier.
- ruleset, the name of the ruleset this graph is in.
- nnodes, the total number of nodes in a graph.
- nedges, the total number of edges in a graph.

- Node Attributes
  - name, the name of this particular node (see chapter 3).

- Edge Attributes
  - source, the domains associated with the source of this edge that are within this aggregator’s domain, in a list starting with the domain for the source within this aggregator’s domain and ending with the host (see section 2.4).
  - dest, same as source except pertaining to the destination side of the edge.
  - id, a textual unique identifier for this edge.

2.3.5 Rule Primitives

The operations available in the engine rules are described in this section. The following binary infix operations are available:

- +, integer and floating point addition
- -, integer and floating point subtraction
- *, integer and floating point multiplication
- /, floating point division
- **, floating point exponentiation
- ::, string concatenation
- ==, numeric equality
- <, numeric less than
- >, numeric greater than
- <=, numeric less than or equal to
- >=, numeric greater than or equal to
- eq, string equality
- lt, string less than
- gt, string greater than
- ne, string inequality
- &&, boolean short-circuit and
- ||, boolean short-circuit or
- ::, string concatenation

One unary operation is available, ! which is the boolean "not" operation.

Set and list constructors are also available. The set construction begins with a '{' and ends with a '}' and contains a comma-separated list of scalars, sets and lists. All the scalars (including those in the sets and lists) become the elements of the constructed set. For example, {'a', {'b', 'c'}} evaluates to the set containing "a", "b", and "c". This list constructor is similar, but is surrounded by '[' and ']'.

The following primitive operations are available using function-call syntax:

- in_set(scalar, set), evaluates to true if the first argument is contained in the set given in the second argument, false otherwise, where string comparison is used
- max(set), evaluates to the numerically largest scalar in the set
- min(set), evaluates to the numerically smallest scalar in the set
- empty(set), evaluates to true if and only if the given set is empty
- on_list(scalar, list), evaluates to true if the first argument is located somewhere on the list given in the second argument, false otherwise, where string comparison is used
- head(list), evaluates to the first scalar on the list
- last(list), evaluates to the last scalar on the list
- sort(list), evaluates to a list containing the same scalars as the given list, but in lexically sorted order
- sort_numerically(list), evaluates to a list containing the same scalars as the given list, but in numerically sorted order
- abs(scalar), evaluates to the absolute value of the given number
- alert(alert_level, message), sends an alert with the given level, message, and no graph (see section 2.6 on alerts)
- report_graph(alert_level, message), as with alert but sends the current graph as well

2.3.6 Importing Functions into the Graph Rules

The graph rules allow user supplied functions to be used in the rules in addition to the built in functions provided by GrIDS. This section describes the syntax and calling convention for such functions.

These functions must be written in Perl. The arguments supplied to the user defined function will be either GrIDS scalars, sets of scalars, or lists of scalars. The user must supply a function prototype and a perl implementation of the function. The prototype is of the form:
list foo(set, scalar, scalar, list, ...)

In addition to scalar, list, and set, “void” is a valid return
type from a function, indicating that no return value should
be expected. Providing prototypes enables GrIDS to check
the types of invocations of this function in the rules.

The conventions on arguments to and return values from
the function are as follows:

- GrIDS scalars become Perl scalars.
- GrIDS lists become references to Perl lists.
- GrIDS sets become references to Perl associative arrays.
  Elements in the GrIDS set hash to a true value, while
  elements not in the set hash to 0 or are not present in
  the associative array.

The functions and prototypes are supplied to the engine in
one or more files. Each file has two parts:

- a prototype part, beginning with the start of the file and
  ending with the start of the code section (or the end of
  file), this section consists of some lines with prototypes
  and some lines which are ignored. If a line begins with
  “void”, “set”, “scalar”, or “list”, possibly preceded by a
  “#”, then the line is taken as a prototype.

- a code part, starting with the first line of the file that
  starts with a “sub”, the section consists of a set of perl
  functions which implement the supplied functions. A
  function begins with a line starting with a sub and ends
  with the line before a line starting with a “sub” (or the
  end of file).

The prototype of a function must precede its implementa-
tion, in whatever order the files are read in.

2.3.7 Rule Grammar

The grammar for the rule language is specified here.

<rules> => <ruleset>*

<ruleset> => 'ruleset' <id> ';' | 'buffer' <constant> ';' | 'timeout' <constant> ';
<macros> <declarations> <preconditions> <report-rules> <combine-rules> <assessments>

<macros> => macros '{' <macrolist> '}'
<macrolist> => <macro> <macrolist> | λ
<macro> => <id> '=' <constant> ';
<constant> => [0-9]+ | [0-9]+ '.' | [0-9]+ | \"" | ["\"]* \""

<declarations> => 'attribute declarations'
                 '{' <decl-list> '}'
<decl-list> => <declaration>;<decl-list> | λ
<declaration> => <id> 'set' | <id> 'list' | <id> 'scalar'
<preconditions> => <node-precondition>
                 <edge-precondition>

 node-precondition => 'node precondition'
                    <expr> ';
<edge-precondition> => 'edge precondition'
                    <expr> ';
<report-rules> => <report-global>
                <report-node> <report-edge>
<report-global> => 'report global rules'
                 '{' <assignment>* '}'
<report-node> => 'report node rules'
                '{' <assignment>* '}'
<report-edge> => 'report edge rules'
                '{' <assignment>* '}'
<combine-rules> => <global-rules> <node-rules> <edge-rules>
<global-rules> => 'global rules'
                 '{' <assignment>* '}'
<node-rules> => 'node rules'
               '{' <assignment>* '}'
<edge-rules> => 'edge rules'
              '{' <assignment>* '}'
<assignment> => <attribute> '=' <expr> ';
<assessments> => 'assessments'
               '{' <assessment>* '}'
<assessment> => <expr> '==>' <actions> ';
<actions> => ( <action> ',' )* <action> | λ
<action> => <assignment> | <function-call>
<attribute> => <object-indic> '.' <id> | <id>
<object-indic> => <graph-indic> <domain-indic>
Figure 2.1: Two machines connecting in the production department.

\[
<\text{graph-indic}> = \text{'res.' | 'cur.' | 'new.' | } \lambda
\]

\[
<\text{domain-indic}> = \text{'global' | 'node' | 'edge' | 'source' | 'dest'}
\]

\[
<\text{expr}> = <\text{attribute}> | <\text{constant}> | !<\text{expr}>
\]

\[
<\text{function-call}> = \text{'}(<\text{expr}>)\text{'} | \text{'}(<\text{expr-list}>)\text{'} | \text{'}(<\text{expr-list}>)\text{'} | <\text{regex}>
\]

\[
<\text{regex}> = <\text{attribute}>='-' | '/' | <\text{anything}>* '/'
\]

\[
<\text{expr-list}>= <\text{expr}> | <\text{expr}> ',,' | <\text{expr-list}>= \lambda
\]

\[
<\text{binary-op}>= \text{'}+\text{'} | \text{'-' | '/'} | \text{'*'} | \text{'}=' | \text{'\&\&'} | \text{'|'} | \text{'\|'} | \text{'eq'} | \text{'ne'} | \text{'gt'} | \text{'lt'} | \text{'le'} | \text{'ge'}
\]

\[
<\text{id}> = [A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9]*
\]

\[
<\text{function-call}>= <\text{id}>='(' <\text{expr-list}> ')
\]

The above grammar is more permissive than the semantics actually allow. For example, 'source' and 'dest' only have meaning within edge rules although the grammar allows it elsewhere as well. Node attributes should only be assigned to inside node rules and edge attributes only within edge rules.

2.4 Aggregation of Graphs

2.4.1 Introduction to Aggregation

Graph engines build graphs of activities within a certain portion of a network. Take as an example, the graph engine which collects reports from all the machines within the Production department of ACME Inc. These machines do not necessarily fit physically on a single network, but from a human perspective, they all lie within the Production department.

Often, two machines within the Production department may connect, as shown in Figure 2.1. The report of the connection is seen by the engine in the production department.

Sometimes, a connection from within the department of a particular graph engine is made to a host outside that graph engine’s realm. For example, in Figure 2.2, a connection within the Production department is made to a host in the Management department. The management end of the connection is clearly outside the realm of the Production department’s graph engine, yet the connection is visible to it. The Production department’s engine builds a graph as shown in Figure 2.3, but the engine must also "pass up" to a higher level engine (i.e., aggregator) this report that goes outside its realm. To do this, engines must be able to recognize nodes that lie within their department and nodes that are not. Hence, engines keep record of all host and department names which lie within their realm. In this example, the engine in the Production department sends a report to the aggregator for ACME Inc. because it does not recognize "host1.management.ACME.com" as a department or host that Production contains.

We assume that an engine for ACME exists and is running to accept this report. It receives a report from Production and sees that the connection occurs between two departments both of which lie within ACME. (Similarly, the Management department will have built its own graph and sent a report up to ACME’s engine.) The ACME Inc. engine creates the graph shown in Figure 2.4, showing the two departments as nodes and the hosts within those departments that were involved as attributes on the link.

Figure 2.2: Connection from production to management.

Figure 2.3: The production department graph engine’s view of the same situation.

Figure 2.4: The view according to the engine for Acme Inc.
Imagine now that the entire .com domain is watched by a Grids engine. When a connection comes out of ACME Inc to Widgets Inc, as shown in Figure 2.5, the ACME aggrega-
tor must "pass up" news of this to the .com engine, which
builds the graph shown in Figure 2.6. As in Figure 2.4, the
link is decorated with the names of the hosts involved in the
connection. But this time, there were also departments in-
volved which do not show up at the engine's level. Hence,
they too are denoted on the link. In general, all departments
and hosts on the source and dest side that cannot be seen at
the engine's level will be listed on the link, recursively.

More realistically, imagine that ACME is running Grids
and Widgets is also, but no overall .com Grids engine exists.
Also imagine that ACME and Widgets do not share Grids
data. (Perhaps they don't trust each other.) When ACME's
engine sees a connection going out to Widgets, it produces a
diagram as shown in Figure 2.7. The diagram shows that a con-
nection comes out of host1 within the Production department
(both of which are known) and goes to some unknown ma-
cine called host1.accouting.widgets.com. Because, in this
element, there is no Grids engine running at a higher level
than ACME, the ACME engine does not aggregate the graph
shown in Figure 2.7 upwards.

2.4.2 Aggregating Attributes

Links in graphs show all hidden departments and hosts
involved in the link. This is done through the use of
the automatically computed "source" and "dest" link at-
tributes. Having this information available allows the
rules to analyze the links more fully and make more pre-
cise decisions regarding them. For the same purpose, at-
tributes of hidden departments and hosts may be included
in the link information, but only through explicit stor-
age of such attributes. Look again at Figure 2.5. When
the connection between host1.production.ACME.com and
host1.accounting.widgets.com is seen by the .com engine (as-
sumed again that it exists), the node attributes of host1.production.ACME.com
and host1.accounting.widgets.com would not necessarily be
available, though they may be of interest.

2.4.3 When Reports Are Sent to the Parent
Engine

Whenever a graph engine makes a change to the global at-
tributes of a rule set, the new attributes for that space is
passed upwards (seen at the next level up as a node report.)
Whenever a connection is entered to a graph space which con-
tains one side in the realm of the engine and one side out of
the realm of the engine, a report of the connection is passed
upwards with the attributes present on the edge after the ex-
ecution of the rules. Both of these upward propagations are
on a per-ruleset basis, with the reports from a particular rule-
set only being applied to the same ruleset at the higher level.
Note that the realm of engine at the next level up may still
not contain the foreign host, in which case it can enter the
link into its graphs but then must pass it up as well.

2.4.4 Graph Aggregation Details

Recall that a department shows up as a node in the parent
domain's aggregator and that rulesets may permit multiple
instances of nodes with the same name to appear in separate
graphs within a ruleset. Not only are graph attribute reports
destined for a particular ruleset in the parent, they are also,
in general, destined for a particular instance of a node.

Associated with each graph being constructed by the en-
gine is a graph identifier (gid) that is unique within the ruleset
for a department. Similarly, associated with each node that
represents a department is an instance identifier. The in-
stance id on a node is the same as the gid of the graph whose
global attributes correspond to the node's attributes. Thus
there is a correspondence between a graph at a lower level
and a node at a higher level. When the global attributes on
a graph change, the updated attribute values are sent to the
particular node in the parent that corresponds to the graph
at lower department level (i.e. has the same name as that
of the department and has the instance id that is that same
as the gid). The attributes that are sent up are constructed
into a graph (as per the rules in the ruleset) and merge (also
as per ruleset rules) with the graph containing that instance,
thereby (potentially) updating the attributes on a node and
graph.
However, as time proceeds, graphs can be combined at the lower level, the graphs at the higher level can merge (thus causing the department node instances to merge), and graphs at either level may be inactive long enough to time out. There is also the case of the first attribute report from a graph and the case where the attribute report was rejected at the higher level. These cases must be dealt with since there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between graphs and node instances.

The way this is done is that when two graphs combine, the resulting graph inherits the gids of each graph. Thus as time goes along and graphs merge, the set of gids on a graph include all the gids of all the graphs that contributed to the forming of that graph. When an attribute report is sent up, it is sent to each of the node instances corresponding to the gids on the graph. The graphs containing the instances are used as a more restricted set of graphs to potentially combine with than in the non-aggregated case (where any graphs in the ruleset might combine, assuming they pass the adjacency test). If the graphs containing those instances decide to accept the report (by merging with it), the usual thing happens when reports are accepted into multiple graphs, that being that all the graphs are combined. In the case where there are no graphs containing any of the node instances to which the report was sent (perhaps they all timed out), then the aggregated report is treated like a normal (non-aggregated) report and may be combined with any graph in the ruleset.

When instances of a node combine (because the graphs containing the combined), the instance ids then correspond to the same node as would be expected. In a sense, the instance ids are inherited in much the same manner as gids were inherited when graphs combined. In the case where graph reports from a graph do not get incorporated into the graph that the last report from the same graph did (due to restrictive combining rules), the new graph formed will be the target of the next attribute report from that graph. It should be noted here that not all nodes have instance ids associated with them, just those that correspond to departments (as opposed to hosts).

### 2.4.5 Graph Aggregation Example

An example should help make things clearer. First let’s define some notation. Let a subscripted name of a department or host that is capitalized denote a graph in that department and one that is subscripted and in lower case denote a node in the parents engine that corresponds to the department. The subscripts on each of these are the id(s) associated with the graph or node.

Consider a department A which is one of Department B’s children. At some point there is a graph in A, A1, which corresponds to a node a1 in one of B’s graphs, B7. Changes in A1’s global attributes are sent to B7 since B7 contains a1. (see Figure 2.10.) Now suppose a new graph A2 is created. Suppose that its graph attributes propagated upward and caused a new graph B9 to be created within B’s engine. Now changes in A1’s global attributes are sent to B9 and changes in A2’s
After a fashion, $A_1$ and $A_2$ merge forming $A_{1,2}$. Now all attribute reports from $A_{1,2}$ are sent to both $B_7$ and $B_9$. (see Figure 2.12.) Later on $A_3$ gets created and its initial attributes propagating upwards (which don’t end up being directed at an particular graph) is intermediately put in newly created $B_{1,2}$ which contains $a_3$. At the merge phase, $B_{1,2}$ and $B_9$ merge, forming $B_{9,12}$ which necessarily contains a node $a_{2,3}$. As Figure 2.13 shows, at this point changes to $A_{1,2}$’s global attributes are still sent to both $B_7$ and $B_{9,12}$ and changes to $A_3$’s attributes are sent to $B_{9,12}$. Thus note it is possible for multiple graphs in a lower level to correspond to the same higher level node.

### 2.5 Buffers

The GrIDS engine has three buffering mechanisms to serves different ends:

- to sorts events, which could come in out of order, by time,
- to remove redundant reports, and
- to adjust reports to be correct from a particular engine’s point of view.

All incoming reports are assumed to have a *time* attribute which represents the true time at which the event to which they refer occurred.

The $\alpha$ buffer sorts them by this attribute as much as possible, before giving them to the rest of the engine. As part of
any given ruleset, a lag time $\alpha \geq 0$ is specified. The buffer will correct any out of order events if they are not out by more than $\alpha$. Note that differences between the system clocks on the source and engine hosts affects how well the buffer works. If an incoming event is already out of date by more than $\alpha$ on arrival, then it is handed off to the rest of the engine immediately.

The $\beta$ buffer acts to coalesce multiple reports of the same thing. Since the buffer stores things in time order, it can check when an event is reported if it has been reported already in an identical manner (by another sniffer, for instance) by looking back in the buffer $\beta$ time. If any entries match as being the same (a best guess, subject to engine implementation details), the "new" data is dropped. This is valuable for networks ripe with sniffers, where each link activity may be reported identically many times. If two data sources witness the same thing, but report it differently, both reports will go into the buffer to be fed to the rest of the engine.

It is beneficial to remove redundant reports since adding identical reports into the engine causes the engine to work multiple times. The $\beta$ buffer reduces this by eliminating all but one of the reports. However, the buffer is only $\beta$ long, so if some data source has enough lag time in reporting, this late report may not be eliminated. For efficiency, $\beta$ should be set (according to a network’s behavior) to a value that accounts for most lags, but does not make the buffer too long. The individual rulesets do not specify $\beta$ like they do $\alpha$. Instead, it is specified for the graph engine as a control variable (see section 2.8). Hence, each ruleset can be thought of as having its own ordering buffer, but sharing a common redundancy reducing buffer.

The $\gamma$ buffer serves to reconcile the hosts or departments mentioned in reports with the departments in which they belong for the perspective of a particular engine, which operates at a particular department. If a host or department is (recursively) contained in the engine’s department, then its node is renamed to be the appropriate child of the engine. The source and dest auto-computed attributes are also updated. The reason this step is needed is shown in Figure 2.14. There, department $A$ reports a connection from host $a$ to host $b$ as $A$ to $b$ whereas department $B$ would report the same connection as being from $a$ to $B$. From the point of view of department $R$, the report should be from $A$ to $B$. The engine could have been designed to know all of its descendants, but this might require updating several engines every time a host or department changed departments. Instead, the gamma buffer monitors incoming reports for the source and dest attributes of edges to automatically discover its hierarchy. However, initially no information is known about the child corresponding to a reported host or department. This issue is addressed by buffering reports whose source and destination cannot be immediately resolved to be descendants of the department. They are kept in the buffer for up to $\gamma$ seconds. The engine attempts to resolve the department for the nodes for up to $\gamma$ seconds. If either the source or destination is a child of the department, then the report is assumed to be fully resolved and any remaining unresolved nodes are foreign to the department of the engine. Otherwise, the report is discarded as not of interest for the department, since both hosts sides are out of the scope of this department. Note that in the example above, provided that the two reports are given to the engine within $\gamma$ seconds of each other, then both reports could be properly reconciled regardless of whether the engine knew that host $a$ was in department $A$ and that host $b$ was in department $B$ beforehand.

The order of the buffers for a new report is $\beta$, $\gamma$, then $\alpha$.

2.6 Alerts

When a ruleset detects what it considers to be suspicious activity, it sends an alert message to the user interfaces that are monitoring the engine (as determined by the organizational hierarchy server, chapter 4). The rule primitives "alert" and "report\_graph" are used to send these alerts. See the rule primitives section (section 2.3.5) for details on these primitives.

Alerts always contain the name of the ruleset that generated it, a message, and an alert level. The message is some
text to indicate the the user what the alert is about. The alert level is a number between 1 and 3 which the user interface uses of indicate the seriousness of the alert, with higher numbers indicating more serious alerts. Alerts may contain the graph corresponding to the generated alert in the standard GrIDS format described in section 3.3.

Alerts are sent using the GrIDS common packet format (chapter 3.1). The header used is ”alt” and the body contains these elements in order: the ruleset name, the message, the graph (or the empty sting if no graph is being sent, and the alert level.

### 2.7 Query language

For increased usability, the graph engine accepts queries regarding its graphs. Queries select which graphs are to be returned.

English examples of permitted constraints follow: ”Contains lhotse”, ”contains a link between lhotse and denali”, ”within ruleset 1 containing lhotse with the attribute ‘compromised’.”

The engine checks each graph it contains against the list of statements. If all the statements are true for a graph, then that graph is returned.

For efficiency of checking, not all types of statements are allowed. Referring to attributes are on some node or edge is not allowed, because the engine would have to search through each node/edge to check for a match and this might slow the engine significantly if the engine contains many graphs of if the graphs are large. However, once you have specified the global attribute, or the attribute on a specific node/edge, you may perform operations on that attribute that evaluate to TRUE or FALSE. The statement is considered true if the operation evaluated to true. Specific nodes are identified by their “name” attribute. Edges are identified by their source and destination. Note that this may be ambiguous.

The syntax of the constraints is the same as that of individual ruleset rules except that attributes are specified with different prefixes. Bare attributes (i.e. “a”) and attributes prefixed with “global” indicate global attributes of the graph. Those attributes of the form “<text” node.<id> refer to attributes of the node with the name equal to the indicated text. For example “lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu” node.time refers to the “time” attribute on the node with attribute “name” equal to lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu. “lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu -> sierra.cs.ucdavis.edu” edge.time refers to an edge from “lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu” to “sierra.cs.ucdavis.edu”. If there is more than one edge, one is chosen in some unspecified manner.

Queries corresponding to the above examples are:

defined("lhotse").node;
defined("lhotse -> denali").edge;
defined("denali -> lhotse").edge;

ruleset eq "ruleset1" && defined("lhotse").node.comprimised;

GrIDS packets coming into the engine with the header ”q” are interpreted as queries with the text of the query in the body.

The engine returns the query results to the querier in the GrIDS common packet format with the header "qi". The return value of a query is a composite graph of all graphs which passed the tests (see chapter 3.1). The following grammar is used for the list:

<graph-list> --> [<graph> <graph-list>]

where graph is defined in the communications protocol grammar.

### 2.8 Controlling the Graph Engine

A running graph engine is controlled by the same mechanisms which are used for data sources (see chapter 5). The state variables which affect its operation include the following.

- **listen_udp**: The UDP port on which the engine is listening.
- **listen_tcp**: The TCP port on which the engine is listening.
- **department**: A department this engine is running for.
- **parent_aggregator**: The name or IP address and port for the aggregator to send reduced graph reports to. The format is name:port or ip-address:port or the empty string if there is no parent.
- **childrenname**: True if the host or department with name “name” is a child of this engine.
- **rulesets{foo}**: The graph engine rules for ruleset foo.
- **alert_recipients{host:port}**: True if and only if the host/port is somewhere to send alerts to. The format of the index is as in the value of parent_aggregator.
- **beta**: The β value to use for buffering (see section 2.5).
- **debug{foo}**: Set to true to start debugging for ruleset foo, and to false to stop debugging.
Chapter 3

Communication amongst Components

3.1 How GrIDS components communicate

The basic communication paradigm in GrIDS is message based (as opposed to using RPC, distributed objects, etc). GrIDS components send a number of different kinds of messages to each other. These include:

- Reports of events or partial aggregations of events (section 3.3).
- Queries for graphs (section 2.7).
- Get/Set messages to control the operation of GrIDS components (chapter 5).
- Messages to view or alter the organizational hierarchy (chapter 4).

This section describes aspects of GrIDS messages that are common to all types of communication.

Firstly, although all GrIDS communications do occur in discrete messages, sometimes it is convenient to send GrIDS packets over TCP, and sometimes it may be convenient to send multiple GrIDS packets within a single UDP packet. GrIDS conventions are as follows.

All GrIDS packets, UDP or TCP, contain a header and a body. The header is any scalar (in the Perl sense - i.e. including strings), and the body is a list of scalars. Lists of any length are allowed.

The packet head serves to identify the type of packet to any GrIDS software that may receive it. The body holds the actual information. The presently allowed values for the header are shown in table 3.1. Headers other than this are not allowed in GrIDS packets. The third column of the table gives a section reference where this particular kind of message is described.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Ref</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Get request for a variable</td>
<td>5.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gr</td>
<td>Response to a Get request</td>
<td>5.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>Set request for a variable</td>
<td>5.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sr</td>
<td>Response to a Set request</td>
<td>5.1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdv</td>
<td>Get for a software manager variable</td>
<td>6.9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdvr</td>
<td>Response to a gdv</td>
<td>6.9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sdv</td>
<td>Set for a software manager variable</td>
<td>6.9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sdvr</td>
<td>Response to an sdv</td>
<td>6.9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghv</td>
<td>Get for variable via software manager</td>
<td>6.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghvr</td>
<td>Response to a ghv</td>
<td>6.9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siv</td>
<td>Set for variable via software manager</td>
<td>6.9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sivr</td>
<td>Response to a siv</td>
<td>6.9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>Graph language report from data source</td>
<td>5.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Aggregation report between engines</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>Query to the graph engine</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr</td>
<td>Response to a graph engine query</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt</td>
<td>Alert generated by a ruleset</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lvr</td>
<td>Request part of organizational hierarchy</td>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lv</td>
<td>Part of the organizational hierarchy</td>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lve</td>
<td>Error in a hierarchy request</td>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lvu</td>
<td>Invalidation of part of the hierarchy</td>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>htr</td>
<td>Request for a hierarchy transaction</td>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Allowable headers in GrIDS packets

3.2 The Message API

A common function interface library is available to all GrIDS components to handle packaging single or multiple packets into the format described above. We document this API for
sending messages, rather than the actual wire encoding, which is regarded as an interface detail.

The message API includes the following functions.

\[
\text{init}() \begin{array}{l}
\text{(TCP\_PORT,$\text{UDP\_PORT,MAX\_CLI,CLOSE\_MESSAGE})}
\end{array}
\]

init is used for initialization of the message system. The specified ports are to bind to for future receipt of messages. MAX\_CLI is the number of TCP connections that can be kept open simultaneously.

\[
\text{tcp\_send}() \begin{array}{l}
\text{(HOST,TCP\_PORT,HEADER,BODY})
\end{array}
\]

This function is used to send a single GrIDS message to a particular host and port via TCP. The header and the list of body scalars is also provided.

\[
\text{udp\_send}() \begin{array}{l}
\text{(HOST,UDP\_PORT,HEADER,BODY})
\end{array}
\]

This is analogous to the previous call, only using UDP instead of TCP.

\[
\text{tcp\_close}() \begin{array}{l}
\text{(HOST,PORT})
\end{array}
\]

This optional function is used to let the system know that no more communication to a particular host and port will occur for some time, so that it would be useful to close any open connection to it (to free up resources).

\[
\text{shutdown}()
\]

This closes the message system down.

### 3.3 The Graph Language

This section describes how graphs are represented in GrIDS packets. From Chapter 2, reports from data sources are either reports of links, or reports of attributes of links or nodes. In some cases, we need to send graphs instead of nodes and links. For example, first, when a user wants to visualize the graphs currently kept by an aggregator. Second, if we want to move an aggregator or to restart/reboot an aggregator, the aggregator should be able to request the current graphs from its child aggregators. Third, when an aggregator sends multiple reports to its parent aggregator, they can be combined and be sent as one report and hence reducing the communication bandwidth required. This will happen when, say, an event can trigger multiple rules to be fired.

We use a modified DOT[4] graph grammar to represent graphs. Doing so allows us to use the same representation for GrIDS components to communicate and for presenting graphs to a human user. The graph grammar is shown in Section 3.3.7.

#### 3.3.1 Labeling Nodes and Edges

We use a fully qualified domain name (e.g., olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu) or a unique department name to label a node. The former is used to name a host, and the latter is used to name an internal node in the hierarchy. Fully qualified domain names (FQDN) are used instead of IP addresses because a host can have multiple IP addresses associated with it. What we want is a uniform way to uniquely label a host.

We use a 6-tuple to uniquely identify a TCP connection — source host, source port, destination host, destination port, sequence number of the first SYN packet, start time. If a connection is seen by multiple sniffers, they will report the same sequence number associated with the first SYN packet sent by the TCP client to the TCP server. Because TCP uses a 32-bit field for sequence numbers, it will take a long time before the same sequence number will be reused. Thus we can use the sequence number to aggregate reports from different sniffers. Moreover, we will also use the start timestamp of the TCP connection to differentiate among TCP connections that have the same sequence number. If some cases, some fields might be missing. For instance, a TCP wrapper does not know the source (i.e., remote) port number and the TCP sequence number of a TCP connection. An aggregator which receives reports with missing fields has to make some “guesses”, say based on the timestamp, to combine the corresponding reports.

We use a 6-tuple to uniquely identify a UDP “connection” — source host, source port, destination host, destination port, start timestamp, and udpid. A udpid consists of the sniffer’s id and a 16-bit integer. The latter is generated by a counter which is incremented after each use. We use timestamp and udpid to uniquely identify a UDP “connection”. By a UDP “connection”, we refer to a sequence of UDP packets that belong to the same transaction. It is left to the sniffer design to determine how to group UDP packets into UDP “connections”. For instance, the time the packets are observed may be used. If a sniffer observes a UDP packet and decides that it belongs to an existing UDP “connection”, the timestamp and the udpid of the first UDP packet is used to identify the “connection”.

#### 3.3.2 Reports Containing a Connection

The following is an example report sent by a data source to an aggregator. The report shows a connection from helvellyn to jaya with the three link attributes (stime, destination port, and thumbnail).

```
digraph sniffer {  
  helvellyn.cs.ucdavis.edu -> jaya.cs.ucdavis.edu  
  [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
    stime=33311222, seq=12345,  
    tpnt = "A487 235B FF72 DTA1"];
```

```
3.3.3 Reports Containing a Host

The following is an example report on host blanc:

digraph ex_mon {
    blanc.cs.ucdavis.edu [ time=23472358,
                        alert="ex_monitor"];  
}

3.3.4 Reports Containing a Graph

The following is an example report representing three concurrent connections from olympus to blanc, rainier, and sierra and a global attribute, nedges.

digraph worm2 {
    nedges=3; 
    olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> blanc.cs.ucdavis.edu 
          [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
           stime=823112009, seq=23232]; 
    olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu 
          [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
           stime=823112020, seq=13131]; 
    olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> sierra.cs.ucdavis.edu 
          [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
           stime=823112031, seq=10101]; 
}

The next example shows how reports correspond to different rules can be combined and sent as one report. Let us assume that there is a network policy that prevents user C from connecting from olympus to sierra. In the example, “composite” is used as the graph id of the entire graph, and graphs corresponding to (possibly) different rules are represented as subgraphs.

digraph composite {
    subgraph worm2 {
        olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> blanc.cs.ucdavis.edu 
            [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,
             stime=823112009, seq=23232]; 
        olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu 
            [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
             stime=823112020, seq=13131]; 
        olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu -> sierra.cs.ucdavis.edu 
            [ctype="tcp", sport=1024, dport=25,  
             stime=823112031, seq=10101]; 
    }
}

3.3.5 Representing Attributes on Nodes, Edges and Graphs

As demonstrated above, the attributes associated with nodes and edges and their corresponding values are stored as a comma-separated list within square brackets after the listing of that node or edge. Graph attributes with their values are listed at the top level of the “digraph” for the graph. In any case, the basic format is “name=value”.

Regardless of the way a particular component represents its attributes internally, they have a common denotation in the Graph Language, referred to as flattened attribute format. This denotation depends on the type of the attribute. Recall that in GrIDS, attributes can be of type scalar, set of scalars, or list or scalars. Scalars are represented as the ASCII text as associated with the scalar, i.e. “abc” or “I”. Sets are denoted in accordance to the common mathematical convention of being scalars, comma-separated and enclosed by curly braces, i.e. “{a, b}” and “I”. The order of the scalars, of course, does not matter for sets. Lists are represented in a similar fashion, but with square brackets surrounding the scalars, i.e. “[a, b]” and “[3]”. Whitespace surrounding scalars is significant in all three types.

However, this representation can lead to ambiguity. Consider for instance the set consisting of one member “a,b”. A method is provided to encode scalars and the scalar elements of sets and lists which might be misinterpreted. “%xx” is understood to stand for character whose hex representation of the character’s ASCII value is xx, i.e. “%2c” for a comma, so the above mentioned set would be represented as “%2c”. The characters that must be encoded to avoid confusion are: “”, “{”, “}”, “[”, “]”, and “%”; however, any character may be encoded in this manner.

3.3.6 Quoting in the Graph Language

As in the DOT language, names of graphs, edges, nodes, and attributes as well as attribute values can be put inside of double quotes to avoid confusion with syntactic constructs of the language; however a backslash may not be
used to hide the following character. Instead, a more general method is used, referred to as DOT-encoding, described a bit later. The DOT documentation does not make it clear under what circumstances a name or attribute value must be double quoted. However it is prudent to quote strings containing non-alphanumeric characters and words such as “node”, “edge”, and “digraph”.

DOT-encoding is similar to the encoding used for scalars in the flattened-attribute format described above, however a “#” is used instead of “\" as the delimited. That is, “#xx” represents the character whose ASCII number is xx in hexadecimal. The characters that must be encoded in this manner are “””, “\”, “#”, whitespace and non-printable characters. Other characters may optionally be encoded in this manner as well. Note that DOT-encoding is not an alternative for flattened attribute encoding used for attribute values. DOT-encoding is done after this encoding.

Take, as an example, the this portion of a Graph Language graph:

```
hello -> "good#32bye" [color="ruby",
"alerts"=""{"tuesday's#0agone",#23#83,7}];
```

That text represents an edge going from a node “hello” to one called “good bye” with a scalar “color” attribute with value “ruby” and an “alerts” attribute which is a set consisting of the scalars: “tuesday\n\n\ngone” (where “\n” is the newline character), “#” concatenated with the characters whose ascii value is 131 decimal, and the scalar number 7.

### 3.3.7 Graph Grammar

Non-terminals are enclosed by `< >`. The terminals [ and ] are enclosed by a pair of double quotes. Graph ID’s, `<id>`, is any alphanumeric string not beginning with a digit, but possibly including underscores, or a number, or any DOT-encoded double-quoted string. `<edgeop>` is `->` in directed graphs. `<text>` is some flattened-attribute-encoded text.

```
<graph> -> digraph <id> {<stmt-list>}
<stmt-list> -> [<stmt> ; <stmt-list>]
<stmt> -> <node-stmt>|<edge-stmt>|
   <subgraph>|<attr-id>=<attr-value>
<node-stmt> -> <node-id>
   [ "[ "<attr-list> "]" ]
<edge-stmt> -> <node-id> <edgeop> <node-id>
   [ "[ "<attr-list> "]" ]
<node-id> -> <fqdn> | <id>
<fqdn> -> <id>[. <fqdn>]
<attr-list> -> <attr-id>=<attr-val>
   [, <attr-list>]
<attr-val> -> <text> | <set-val> | <list-val>
<set-val> -> "[" <text-list> "]"
<list-val> -> "[" <text-list> "]"
<text-list> -> | <text> ("," <text>)*
<node-list> -> [<node-stmt>], [<node-list>]
```
Chapter 4

The Organizational Hierarchy

4.1 Introduction

In order to process information more scalably, GrIDS assumes that the organization is divided up in a hierarchical tree structure of departments. The way in which this is used to simplify graphs was described in Section 2.4. This chapter deals in how the information about the organizational hierarchy is stored and how it can be dynamically changed while staying in a consistent state.

Each internal node in the hierarchy tree corresponds to a department in the organization. Each leaf node corresponds to a host/machine. Hosts are referred to by their fully qualified DNS names, while departments have unique identifier strings. Departments who are children of other departments in the tree are wholly contained by the parent department. Thus for any pair of departments either one wholly contains the other, or the two are disjoint. Any department may contain both hosts directly, and other departments.

The software infrastructure for a department consists of two components: a graph engine, and a software manager. The engines use the departmental hierarchy as the means for aggregation of graphs, as described in Chapter 2. The software managers control software operation in their local department, and maintain that department’s sense of the hierarchy around it (parent departments, child departments, and hosts directly contained in the department). Their software control function is detailed in Chapter 6, but the hierarchy maintenance is described here.

The whole GrIDS hierarchy requires an Organizational Hierarchy Server (OHS), which is the only place guaranteed to have a complete view of the hierarchy. It is used as a central place to guarantee the consistency of the hierarchy, and to implement such functions as locking. In contrast, the software managers for individual departments have only a local view of the parts of the hierarchy immediately adjacent to their department (this helps transactions - when the hierarchy changes, not everyone needs to be notified).

Additionally, every host that runs GrIDS software (except for user interfaces and the OHS) has a module controller, which is responsible for starting and stopping the GrIDS modules on that host, and for configuring them. The module controllers are described in more detail in Chapter 5.

![Figure 4.1](image) An example hierarchy. Department G is about to be moved from under department E to under department D. An interface and the organizational hierarchy server are also shown.

Finally, user interfaces acquire views of the hierarchy and use them to help users visualize it, and request changes. All changes are performed as transactions on the hierarchy. They are initiated by a user interface, but require the involvement of instances of every kind of GrIDS component. The transactions are described in more detail in Section 4.4.2.

4.2 An example

Before getting lost in the specification of individual messages and transactions, and in the hope of making the overall scheme clearer to the reader, we will step through a complete example of a transaction on the hierarchy, showing how all the major elements of the system are affected. In subsequent sections, protocol details will be described.

Our scenario is depicted in Figure 4.1. We begin with the start up of the interface component. At the outset, the user must supply the interface with the name of a department to which he believes he has access, his user identifier, and his
credentials. In this case, let us suppose that he has access at department $C$, but not at $B$ or $A$. Because of his access at $C$, he will automatically have access in the subtree below this.

In the following, we use the notation $S_C$ to refer to the software manager at $C$, $A_C$ to refer to the aggregator at $C$, $M_C$ to refer to the module controller on the machine on which $S_C$ and $A_C$ are running, and similarly for the other departments. The organizational hierarchy server is $O$, and the interface is $I$.

$I$ contacts $O$ to request a copy of the hierarchy below $C$. $O$ contacts $S_C$ first and verifies that the user does have access at $C$ and his credentials match up. $S_C$ replies in the affirmative. Then $O$ supplies $I$ with a copy of the hierarchy rooted at $C$. $I$ displays this on the user’s screen. The copy is marked with a version number which can be used to determine if it is still valid. $O$ also marks down that $I$ has a copy of this part of the hierarchy. If someone else were to change the hierarchy, $O$ would send a message to $I$ telling it that its version was out-of-date.

Suppose that, having inspected the hierarchy, the user decides to move department $G$ (and by implication, its subtree also) to be under $D$ instead of $E$. The first step is to send a message to $O$. This message describes the planned action and supplies the hierarchy version number on which the planned action was based. $O$ first determines if the planned action is consistent with existing locks in the hierarchy and is based on an up to date version of the hierarchy. If so, it locks the hierarchy appropriately. Next, it contacts $S_D$ and $S_E$ to verify that the user has appropriate permissions. If not, it releases the locks. If any step has failed, an appropriate error message is supplied to the user at this time. Assuming that the action appears feasible, $O$ gives permission for $I$ to go ahead.

Now $I$ contacts $S_E$ and informs it that $G$ is to be moved. Assuming that $S_E$ believes $M_G$, $S_G$ and $A_G$ to be up, it sends messages to $S_G$ telling it that all rulesets inherited from $E$ are to be deleted. $S_E$ also sets these rulesets null via $M_G$. $S_G$ does the same recursively for its children, and then acknowledges to $S_E$. Then $S_E$ sends set messages to $M_G$ which alter where $S_G$ and $A_G$ send messages and where $M_G$ believes its parent to be. Once these actions have succeeded, $S_E$ updates its own data structures and acknowledges completion to $I$.

Next $I$ contacts $S_D$ and informs it of the change. $S_D$ then performs the following actions.

- Contacts $S_G$ and $M_G$ to give them the new rulesets.
- Sets the new value of the inherited access control list on $S_G$ which recursively does the same for the tree below it.
- Sets default policy variables via $M_G$ and $S_G$, with $S_G$ to do the same below it.
- Acknowledges success to $I$

When this is complete, $I$ reports back to $O$ that the action is complete. $O$ then removes appropriate locks on the hierarchy. Finally, $O$ contacts any interfaces that might have been affected and tells them that their information is invalid.

Note that this procedure causes problems if any of the critical actors dies in the middle.

### 4.3 The Organizational Hierarchy Server

The organizational hierarchy server is designed so that it can be shut down and then restarted without any change in the operation of the hierarchy (though no transactions or new viewing will be possible during the shutdown). Transactions in progress before the shutdown must be able to run to completion after the shutdown. Hence, it is necessary for the server to store its state on shutdown and read it again on startup.

The structure of the organizational hierarchy will be stored in a file, represented in modified DOT format. For each internal node in the organizational hierarchy, the file will contain:

- is node a department or a host (zero children is not a reliable indicator)
- department name (must enforce uniqueness of dept name)
- location of this department’s aggregator (host:port)
- this node’s parent department ID (unless it’s the root node)
- hosts directly attached to this department (ID list)
- this node’s child departments (ID list)
- location of Software Manager for this node (host:port) (this allows Software Managers to be sparsely distributed within the tree, vs. mapping 1-1 to departmental nodes)

For each host node in the organizational hierarchy, the file will contain:

- is node a department or a host (zero children is not a reliable indicator)
- host name
- this node’s parent department name
- location (port) of Module Controller (omit if there is a universal port number for it)

The syntax of the file is as follows,

```xml
<Organizational-Hierarchy-Structure> ::= <node>

<node> ::= [ <host-node>; | <dept-node> ; ] [ <node> ]

<host-node> ::= 'host', <host-name> ', ', <MC-port>
```

25
We expect graph rule sets (and/or policies) to change fairly often. Thus we decided that rule sets will not be stored in this central Organizational Hierarchy file.

All accesses to this file will be channeled through an Organizational Server, to assure coherent updates and consistent views. This Server will constrain access to the file by implementing both read locks and write locks on the entire file. However, to permit finer locking granularity in the future, our protocol design will allow locks to be specified on particular departmental subtrees. If and when the Server becomes a bottleneck (e.g., when we scale beyond some point), then the Server implementation can be upgraded to allow more concurrent access, without modifying the protocol.

Also, note that Write locks on subtrees could in the future be used to indicate that a Software Manager has “checked out” a particular subtree, thus distributing the organizational hierarchy for arbitrarily long periods. Making those checkout periods permanent might defuse various real-world departments’ concerns about deployment and access control (e.g., they may not want others to read names of all their hosts).

### 4.4 Organizational Hierarchy Messages

#### 4.4.1 Introduction

A number of messages are sent to the organizational hierarchy server, and they are described in this section. All these messages are GrIDS packets and use the GrIDS Common Packet Format (GCPF) defined in section 3.1.

All transactions follow a roughly similar pattern (a detailed description of the case of a move can be found in section 4.2). There is an initial request to change the hierarchy from an interface to the OHS. This has a header htr (hierarchy transaction request). The hierarchy server checks the feasibility of the request, and then responds with a message having a htp (hierarchy transaction permission) header which authorizes the interface to go ahead with the change. Alternatively, an hve message may indicate an error. After the change has been completed, the interface informs the hierarchy server of that fact with a message having a header htc (hierarchy transaction completed).

In addition to transactions, there are also messages asking to view some portion of the hierarchy. These have a header hvr (hierarchy view request). The OHS will then respond with a hv (hierarchy view) message.

#### 4.4.2 Transaction Types

**Hierarchy View Request (hvr)**

These messages represent a request to see a particular section of the organizational hierarchy. The sender will generally be an interface, and the receiver will be the OHS. The messages have the following format (with one term per column of the table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User</th>
<th>Password</th>
<th>Dept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*User* is the username of the individual on behalf of whom the interface is acting; *Password* was supplied by that user, and *Dept* is the name of the department for which the user wishes to view the hierarchy.

**Hierarchy View (hv)**

These messages are sent in response to a HVR, and supply the requested information. The format is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dept</th>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Dept* is the name of the department at which this particular hierarchy is rooted; *Serial* is a serial string for this information which can be used later to check validity of requests based on this information; *Hierarchy* is the requested view of the hierarchy.

Two serial strings are considered the same if they are identical considered as a sequence of ASCII characters.
**Hierarchy View Error (hve)**

These messages are sent in response to an hve and indicate that the requested information cannot be supplied. The format is as follows.

```
User  Dept  Error
```

*User* is the requesting user; *Dept* is the name of the department at which this particular hierarchy is rooted; *Error* is an informative message which explains why the hierarchy is not being supplied. Typical reasons would be that the user didn’t have permission, supplied an incorrect password, etc.

Note that *hve*, *hv*, and *he* will all be carried over a TCP connection. Specifically, the interface opens a TCP connection to the OHS, passes the relevant packet, and then waits until the OHS supplies the appropriate response along the same connection before it closes the connection.

**Hierarchy View Update (hvu)**

These messages are initiated by the OHS to inform an interface that it now has invalid information. The messages are sent via UDP and are not acknowledged - this is only a best effort service. Ultimately, we rely on serial strings to catch that a request is based on old information. The format is as follows.

```
Dept  Serial
```

*Dept* is the name of the department at which this particular hierarchy is rooted; *Serial* is the serial string for the view which is no longer valid.

**Hierarchy Transaction Request (htr)**

There are a number of different kinds of these, depending on the particular transaction being attempted.

- **add_host**

  This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to add a host into the named department. The department must exist already, and the host may not already be part of the GrIDS system. The message format is:

  ```
  Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial
  Dept  Host  Port
  ```

  *User* is the the requesting user-id, *Pass* her password, and *Serial* the view of the hierarchy on which this request was based. *Trans-id* is a transaction identifier string which will be used to refer to this particular transaction in future interchanges. It should be unique. *Type* is the string *add_host*, indicating the nature of the transaction. *Host* is the host to be added, and *port* is the port on which its module controller is running. *Dept* is the department name to which this host is to be added.

- **remove_host**

  This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to remove a host from the hierarchy. The host must currently be part of the GrIDS system. Note that this transaction cannot complete if any software managers or aggregators are running on the system, and the OHS should enforce this. The message format is:

  ```
  Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial  Host
  ```

  *User, Pass, and Serial* have their usual meaning. *Type* is the string *remove_host*, indicating the nature of the transaction. *Host* is the host to be removed.

- **move_host**

  This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to move a host within the hierarchy. The host must currently be part of the GrIDS system. The message format is:

  ```
  Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial  Dept  Host
  ```

  *User, Pass, and Serial* have their usual meaning. *Type* is the string *move_host*, indicating the nature of the transaction. *Host* is the host to be moved, and *Dept* is the department to move it to.

- **add_dept**

  This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to create a new department within the hierarchy. The department name must not already be in use. The new department will not have any children until they are added via separate commands. The message format is:

  ```
  Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial
  Dept  Host  Host
  ```

  *User, Pass, and Serial* have their usual meaning. *Type* is the string *add_dept*, indicating the nature of the transaction. *Dept* is the name of the new department, and *Parent* is the department to make it a child of. *Host" is the host on which to run software manager for the new department, while its graph engine will run on *HostA*. This host must already be running a module controller—the port will already be known to the OHS.
- **move_dept**

This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to move an existing department within the hierarchy. The subtree beneath it moves with it. Note that this causes no change in the physical location of the departmental facilities such as the software manager and the aggregator. It simply changes who they report to, inherit rulesets from, etc. The message format is:

```
Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial
Parent  Dept
```

User, Pass, and Serial have their usual meaning. Type is the string `move_dept`, indicating the nature of the transaction. Dept is the name of the department to be moved, and Parent is the department to make it a child of.

- **new_root**

This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to create a new root department for the hierarchy. This can only happen if there is no existing hierarchy and is intended just to be the mechanism for starting a hierarchy from scratch.

```
Type  Trans-id  Dept
Hosts  Ports
```

Type is the string `new_root`, indicating the nature of the transaction. Dept is the name to give to the new department. Hosts and Ports are the hosts on which to run the root department software manager and aggregator respectively. These must already be running module-controllers. However, the OHS must be told the ports of these, which is done in Ports respectively. Note that these are the ports of the module-controllers not the software manager and aggregator themselves. This is an oddity required in bootstrapping the system - we cannot add any hosts until we have a root department to add them into.

- **change_variable**

This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to change some variables (perhaps rulesets or access control lists) in the subtree of some department. It is necessary for the organizational hierarchy server to be involved to ensure that the hierarchy is not changed during the process, possibly resulting in a corrupted state.

```
Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial
```

User, Pass, and Serial have their usual meaning. Type is the string `change_variable`, indicating the nature of the transaction. Dept is the name of the department at or below which changes will be made.

- **move_manager**

This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to change the physical location of the software manager for some department, without changing the actual structure of the hierarchy.

```
Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial  Dept
Hosts  Ports  HostA
```

User, Pass, Serial, and Trans-id have their usual meaning. Type is the string `move_manager`, indicating the nature of the transaction. Dept is the name of the department being changed, and Host is the name of the new host on which to locate the software manager. That host must already be part of the GrIDS system.

- **move_aggregator**

This message indicates that the requesting interface would like to change the physical location of the aggregator for some department, without changing the actual structure of the hierarchy.

```
Type  Trans-id  User  Pass  Serial  Dept
Hosts  Ports  HostA
```

User, Pass, Serial, and Trans-id have their usual meaning. Type is the string `move_aggregator`, indicating the nature of the transaction. Dept is the name of the department being changed, and Host is the name of the new host on which to locate the aggregator. That host must already be part of the GrIDS system.
Hierarchy Transaction Error (hte)
These messages are used by the OHS to inform an interface that a transaction cannot be performed. The format is as follows.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Trans-id} & \text{Error} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question, and Type is the type of transaction request. Error is an explanatory message.

Hierarchy Transaction Permission (htp)
These messages are used by the OHS to inform an interface that it may go ahead with a requested transaction. The format is as follows.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Trans-id} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question.

Hierarchy Transaction Complete (htc)
These messages are sent to the OHS by an interface to say that a transaction has been completed and locks should now be released. In almost all cases, the format is as follows.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Type} & \text{Trans-id} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question, and Type corresponds to the types in the htr messages.

However, there are also a few special cases in which additional information is present. This happens with the port numbers of software managers and aggregators. When a transaction involves moving one of these, the port number that will eventually be used cannot be known reliably at the outset of the transaction. Hence it must be supplied by the interface in the htc message at conclusion. The special cases are:

- **add_department**

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Type} & \text{Trans-id} & \text{Port}_S & \text{Port}_A \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question, and Type is the type of transaction request. Port_S is the port number on which the software manager is now located, and Port_A is the aggregator port.

- **move_manager**

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Type} & \text{Trans-id} & \text{Port}_S \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question, and Type is the type of transaction request. Port_S is the port number on which the software manager is now located.

- **move_aggregator**

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Type} & \text{Trans-id} & \text{Port}_A \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Trans-id is the identifier of the request in question, and Type is the type of transaction request. Port_A is the port number on which the aggregator is now located.

4.5 The View Serial Number Mechanism
In the previous section, hv and htr messages have a Serial field. This section explains the significance and the management of that field.

The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that users do not attempt, accidentally, to make transactions on the hierarchy when they have an inadequate view of it. This can happen either because their view is out of date, or because they are attempting transactions outside of any view they have obtained.

To prevent this, when the OHS gives out a view of some portion of the hierarchy in a hv message, it attaches a serial number. Subsequently, when an interface requests a transaction on the hierarchy, the OHS checks that the serial number is up to date. If not, the OHS gives an hte error message.
Chapter 5

Modules and the Module Controller

GrIDS relies on a variety of software modules, running as processes distributed across multiple machines. Different network topologies, optional rule sets and alternate data sources will require different configurations of these distributed modules. Starting, stopping, reconfiguring and querying these modules on the fly, in a manner that provides the flexibility to handle alternate configurations, is no small task. To accomplish this task, GrIDS provides a Module Controller.

The GrIDS Module Controller is a consistent interface controlling all GrIDS modules running on a particular host. Furthermore, a canonical set of GrIDS Control Variables is defined per module as a way to alter or query a module's current state. The standard set of interface actions invoked by the GrIDS Module Controller, along with a module's set of Control Variables provide all the functionality required to configure GrIDS processes on a host flexibly, dynamically and in a consistent manner.

The remainder of this chapter describes the design and operation of the GrIDS Module Controller, and the GrIDS module Control Variables that can dynamically reconfigure a module's behavior.

5.1 Communication with User Interface

A user interface may communicate via a Module Controller to any GrIDS modules, to re-configure them or to query their status. Each module carries a set of control variables. Requests from the user interface consist of reads or writes to these variables. A single Module Controller per monitored host manages all such requests.

5.1.1 Control Variables

The purpose of control variables is to exhibit and change the state of a GrIDS module. Setting a control variable might cause a module to take action such as shutting itself down, or it might cause the Module Controller to start an instance of some module.

Control variables are named. The names may be any valid Perl variable name. Control variables may have a single value, or they may be indexed (e.g., so that an Aggregator can be dynamically reconfigured and given a new Ruleset.)

A set of standard control variable names will be defined. These standard variables will serve identical functions on different kinds of GrIDS modules.

All values are represented as strings. They may contain any characters except 255. Data other than strings is represented as strings. Numerical data is represented as printable ASCII. Boolean data is represented by the strings “true” and “false”. Lists or sets are represented by indexed arrays.

The set of control variables used by any particular module is static during that module's lifetime. It may not change without introducing a new version of that module. However, any variable name may be indexed by another string. The value of a variable at an unset index is the empty string. A variable index may be removed by setting the value of the variable at that index to the empty string.

5.1.2 Module Controller

One Module Controller will run on each GrIDS host. The Module Controller receives requests from Software Managers through TCP connections. Each request to a GrIDS module on a specific host must go through that host's Module Controller. A request to a Module Controller must specify 1) the name of the module that the request addresses; 2) the module's version number [probably not checked by the initial implementation of the Module Controller]; 3) the department ID on whose behalf that module runs; and 4) the command to be executed. Each request addresses exactly one GrIDS module. If a set of modules must be addressed, a set of requests to individual modules must be issued. To minimize the number of processes, the Module Controller will also be responsible for startup of the all modules on the host.

5.1.3 Protocol

TCP

When a Software Manager wishes to communicate control info with a GrIDS module, it opens a TCP connection to the Module Controller residing on a known port on the appropriate host. We use TCP because we do not want to drop
any control packets, and we do not want to implement error detection/correction manually on top of UDP.

Although establishing a TCP connection involves some overhead, plus an open file handle, this is a small price to pay for reliable control flow.

Because the organizational hierarchy will rarely change, it may be OK for certain TCP connections to remain open indefinitely, e.g., a TCP connection from a Module Controller to the Software Manager of its own department. This allows the TCP setup overhead to be amortized over multiple commands.

Two basic types of commands are supported: Get or Set certain State Variables.

Control variable files and operation

Each GrIDS module will have at least 3 associated files: a command file, a status/response file and an init file (it may be convenient for this initialization file to have the same format as a command file). Other associated files are optional (e.g., one or more logging files to which a module – such as an Aggregator – may write debugging info.) All associated files will comply with a standard file naming convention, to be defined by the implementors.

When a module controller receives an incoming command, it writes that to the command file of the appropriate GrIDS module, then sends that process a signal (eg, USR1). Sometime after receiving that signal, the module will read its command file, obey the command, then update its status/response file. It then will delete its command file, to signal that it has completed its update.

When the module controller sees the command file has been deleted, it then reads that status/response file and forwards any relevant info back along its open TCP command connection. The module controller will also set a 2-second time-out immediately after initially signaling a GrIDS module. If the operation does not complete before the timeout, then the module controller will return an error message along the TCP connection prior to (optionally) closing that connection.

Module Controllers and GrIDS modules themselves are intended to be single-tasking, i.e., each should process only one single command request at a time. Thus, the existence of a command file for some module indicates that the module is busy processing a request. A Module Controller should not write a new command file until the old one is deleted by the module.

A status/response file will consist generally of State Variables and their values. It may be updated asynchronously by its GrIDS module, or synchronously in response to a particular command. GrIDS modules should lock their file when writing it, so if a Module Controller receives a “GET-asynch” command, it will not read a module’s status in the midst of an update.

The operation of the Module Controller is shown in figure 5.1.

Packet Format

Inter-module communications use the general GrIDS Common Packet Format (GCPF) described in chapter 3. The GCPF header is either $g$ for a GET request, $s$ for a SET request, or $gr$ and $sr$ for RESPONSES to GET and SET requests.

The body of a GET, SET, or RESPONSE packet will contain the following fields:

- SET | GET | GET-asynch | OK | ERROR-text | WARNING-text
- GrIDS Module Name
- Version # (minimum acceptable version; assume upward-compatible) (RESPONSE packet may insert actual Version #, or more likely may ignore this field entirely)
- Department ID represented by that module.
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value

The file format of the command file and the status/response file has this same form, although each character-255 separator is followed by a newline for readability.

If a packet is a RESPONSE to a GET command (header $gr$), then all the requested StateVarNames and corresponding Values will be returned, unless there was an error outcome. If this is a RESPONSE to a SET command, then none of the original StateVarNames and corresponding Values will be returned, unless an error occurred. In that case, the response
packet may include only those StateVar/Value pairs that help explain the error.

Note that an ERROR-text value (pertaining to the entire RESPONSE) may appear in the initial field, in addition to other ERROR-text fields which may appear as Values of StateVars. Possible text for ERROR fields include:

- Failure,
- Timeout,
- No such module,
- No module here representing specified Department,
- Bad version number,
- Set failed (invalid value),
- Set failed (read-only variable),
- Set/Get failed (no such StateVarName).
- Set/Get failed (unauthorized access).

5.1.4 Special Aliases & Subcommands to Module Controller

Among the set of required StateVars, we have reserved one special StateVar name as an alias, “ALL_STATE_VARS”.

(The initial implementation may ignore this feature.)

A command to GET ALL_STATE_VARS for some module should return a RESPONSE containing the StateVarName and Values of all its scalar StateVars; for its indexed StateVars, only the indices themselves will be returned within a single Value field, enclosed in squiggly brackets.

A command to,

GET Ruleset { ALL_STATE_VARS }

for some module should return all Rulesets.

A command to,

GET ALL_STATE_VARS { ALL_STATE_VARS }

for some module should generate an exhaustive enumeration of both scalar and indexed StateVars.

By addressing a SET or GET command to the module controller itself, certain subcommands can be represented. A command to the Module Controller to,

GET INVENTORY

would cause the Module Controller to read its Task File and return a list of every GrIDS module currently running on its host.

The SET subcommands START or KILL are defined to start or stop a particular GrIDS module. We illustrate the packet format of a SET subcommand by showing how a new instance of a module is invoked. To STARTUP a new module, send a SET command to the appropriate module controller. It should specify the following named fields (as pseudo control variables) and values:

- module == “module_controller” (Address it to the module controller.)
- mc_command == “START” (Tell module controller its sub-command.)
- mod_module == Official/generic name of module you want to start. This might not be same as its executable pathname.
- mod_department == official dept name the new module represents.
- mod_version (If you know it. Ignored in first implementation.)
- report_to_host_port == (optional) A string of form ‘host:port’ so the new module can locate its parent or significant other. (Defaults to the host:port of the aggregator for that module controller’s department.)
- machine_acl == (optional) host:port of whoever is authorized to issue subsequent SET/GET cmds to this module. (Default is host:port of module controller’s parent.)
- init_file_name == (optional) init file for new module to read.
- path_prefix == (optional) filesystem work area for the new module.

If either of the last two fields are null, the module controller will load them with whatever defaults (perhaps null) come from its CONSTRAINT_TASK_FILE.

The RESPONSE to a SET command (header sr) that contained a START subcommand will return the TCP-port and UDP-port to which the newly created GrIDS module is listening. For example, when a new aggregator module is successfully started by the Module Controller the data fields in the set response packet are as follows:

- OK
- GrIDS Module Name
- Version
- Department ID
- listen_tcp
- tcp port number
- listen_udp
- udp port number
5.2 Library Functions

A set of library functions is provided for the User Interfaces, Module Controllers, Software Managers, and Data Source Modules. Library functions for the User Interfaces include,

- `set_command(Module_Controller, command)`;
- `get_command(Module_Controller, command)` which returns the information requested.

The library functions for the Module Controller include,

- `write_command_file (GrIDS_module, department_ID, command)`;
- `write_config_file (GrIDS_module, command)`;
- `read_config_file (GrIDS_module)`;
- `read_status_response_file (GrIDS_module, department_ID, StateVarNames)`;

The library functions for the GrIDS modules include,

- `read_config_file()`;
- `sig_handler()` which handles signals from the Module Controller;
- `read_command_file()` which returns the command read;
- `write_status_response_file` (in addition to writing out the Values of all StateVars, this will update the required `LAST_UPDATE_TIME` before writing it out);
- `delete_command_file()` which indicates it has finished that command;

A user communicates with all GrIDS modules using the library functions as provided for the User Interface.

Each GrIDS module should support a standard set of “read-only” state variables that describe the execution of the module. They include,

- `running`; which is either True or False;
- `PID`;
- `LAST_UPDATE_TIME`;
- `module_name`;
- `version_number`;
- `department_ID`;

Each GrIDS module also must support a standard set of required state variables to control its execution. They include,

- `execute_config_file`;
- `shutdown`;

5.3 Detailed Design of Module Controller

5.3.1 Startup and Trust Issues for Module Controllers

At startup, the Module Controller reads its own config files to determine:

- parent Software Manager (Host:Port)
- parent Aggregator (Host:Port of Aggregator itself)
- Organizational Hierarchy Server (Host:Port)
- timeout period (to wait for local modules to respond to reconfig)

Liveness Protocol between Module Controller and Software Manager

The uptime/liveness protocol between a Module Controller and its parent Software Manager may be initiated by either party. Each party should identify itself, and assert its kinship relationship with the other. This protocol may cause a Module Controller to question its parentage (rightly or wrongly). If a Module Controller believes an unauthorized Software Manager parent is trying to claim it, or if its overtures are rejected by its purported parent, then the Module Controller should contact the Organizational Hierarchy Server. This method will handle cases where a host (and its Module Controller) is down, and misses the notification that it is being moved to a different department (Software Manager), and henceforth should obey commands from a different parent Software Manager.

Normally, the parent Software Manager will initiate the uptime/liveness protocol by sending a request to GET `Module_Controller_Parent`. The Module Controller – if alive – should respond with the Value of its corresponding StateVar, unless the request is from an unauthorized Host:Port, in which it returns the appropriate ERROR message.

Upon startup, a Module Controller will wait to be contacted by its parent Software Manager. If its parent has not claimed it within some timeout, then the Module Controller will initiate the uptime/liveness protocol, by sending a RESPONSE to a nonexistent request to GET `Module_Controller_Parent`. If the parent is alive and willing to assert its kinship relationship, then it initiates the normal uptime/liveness protocol. This second form of the protocol makes sense in cases where a Module Controller wakes up long after it has been abandoned by its former parent during an organizational change (organizational downsizing leads to family breakup :-)

5.3.2 Special Files for Module Controller

The Module Controller has 2 special config files. Its `Task File` contains commands to invoke (potentially multiple) instances
of certain programs, with appropriate parameters (some of those parms may be variables, e.g., all dumb Data Sources must be given the Host:Port of this department’s Aggregator). This config file is writable by the Module Controller, since it represents a dynamically changing sequence of tasks the Module Controller should execute each time it awakens.

The Module Controller can read — but not write — its Constraint File, its second special config file. This file will map the generic name of a GrIDS module (as it would appear in a Task File) to a specific executable path.

The Constraint File may contain patterns that further constrain what can appear in the Task File, e.g., command-line parameters. In this manner, we can ensure that pathnames and parameters in the Constraint File comprise “safe” commands, yet also allow the Module Controller to dynamically invoke new instances of programs.

(The Module Controller also needs a file to store the PID and config-file path prefix corresponding to each GrIDS module running on its host. It is not sufficient to store these in RAM, because whenever the Module Controller awakens, it must ascertain whether some of its previous children are still alive, to avoid invoking redundant instances of those tasks. This file should also store the department ID that “owns” each task. This file may be a third file, or it may combined with the Task File.)

The main loop of the Module Controller receives a TCP connection and/or packet, decodes the incoming command, decides whether to allow access (based on the source Host:Port), processes the command, and responds to the sender.

5.3.3 Machine Access Control

Most commands are intended for “ordinary” GrIDS modules. By checking the Host:Port of an incoming TCP connection, a Module Controller will allow only its own parent Software Manager to access (via GET or SET) StateVars on an ordinary module. (A Module Controller knows its parent Software Manager via its own StateVars.) Two types of special modules require different access control.

If a module is a Software Manager or an Aggregator, then it may be running on behalf of another department — i.e., not the dept on whose host it is headquartered. In that case, an Aggregator should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own dept’s Software Manager, and a Software Manager should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own Software Manager parent. In general, these may be different from the local Module Controller’s Software Manager parent.

Thus, each instance of an Aggregator or Software Manager must be associated with an ACL specifying which Host:Port is allowed to reconfigure or shut it down. (The initial implementation will allow an ACL to contain only a single Host:Port. This should be sufficient.) The ACL will be implemented as a StateVar for its corresponding module.

The Module Controller will check that ACL before allowing Write access to an Aggregator. The Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent is implicitly granted Read access to every module running on that host. Commands to GET or SET from other Host:Port origins are unauthorized, and should generate an error message as a response.

5.3.4 Access Control for Special Modules

It is the responsibility of a Module Controller to perform this enhanced access-control checking when it receives commands directed at an Aggregator module. Thus, to perform authorized reconfiguration of a resident-alien Aggregator, the Module Controller must be able to read (and write) a file containing the Aggregator’s ACL.

In contrast, since a Software Manager will reconfigure itself, it performs the access-control check itself (the Module Controller is not involved in the protocol at all). Although the local Module Controller does not need to read a resident-alien Software Manager’s ACL file, it does need read access to certain info in the Software Manager’s config file.

This is because a Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent has the “right” to inventory all modules running within its domain. Hence the Module Controller needs read access to config files of resident-alien Aggregators and Software Managers, so it can determine who they represent. (This capability allows a Module Controller to return a helpful error message if a User Interface tries to delete its host, yet a foreign Software Manager is headquartered on it.) Note that a Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent is not allowed write or shutdown access to a resident-alien Aggregator or Software Manager that is already running.

Finally, who should be authorized to start a new Software Manager or Aggregator dynamically? A Module Controller should obey incoming commands from its own departmental Software Manager to start a new Aggregator or Software Manager.

But after launch, write-access to a new Aggregator or Software Manager should be allowed only from whatever Host:Port was specified in its startup command (and stored in its ACL file). In this manner, a native Software Manager authorizes the residency of a foreign module. (By setting strict constraints on the invocation parameters of a Software Manager in the special config file, a department can prevent certain foreign departments from headquarters their Software Managers or Aggregators on its host.)

5.3.5 Module Controllers Should Use Standard Port

Humans will attempt to ensure that all Module Controllers occupy the same known port on all hosts. This value will be loaded by hand into each host node in the Organizational Hierarchy file. When a Module Controller must occupy a non-standard port, it is the responsibility of human operators manually to update the Organizational Hierarchy file to reflect that situation.
5.3.6 Deleting Hosts Running Critical Modules

When a host is to be deleted, we already specified this operation should fail (with an informative error message) if the host is running any Aggregator or Software Manager. Thus, the Module Controller must know every GrIDS module it is running, including resident-aliens. Because the Module Controller has implicit Read-access to resident-aliens' config files, this allows the Module Controller to inform a User Interface whose Aggregator is causing an error in response to a host-delete command.

5.3.7 What Software is Executing?

The Module Controller will have a known set of StateVars. A request, e.g., to GET INVENTORY, would cause the Module Controller to read its Task File and return a list of every GrIDS module currently running on its host.

5.4 Special Case: GrIDS Data Sources

A GrIDS data source is a module that provides information to an aggregator. It may be such a thing as an IP sniffer or a host based intrusion detection system.

5.4.1 Data Source Control

Ordinary data sources must engage in two distinct forms of communication; they must provide an aggregator with graph node and link attributes, and they must respond to configuration requests. Attribute reports are sent by the data source directly to the aggregator using a protocol based on TCP. Configuration requests are sent by entities such as user interfaces using a protocol based on TCP. They are received by a Module Controller on that host, which forwards them to the appropriate data source module and then sends a response back to the querying entity. The basic configuration is shown in figure 5.2.

Note that an Aggregator is, itself, a module that can be reconfigured only via a Module Controller. In contrast, a Software Manager is, itself, a module that is typically started by a Module Controller, but that subsequently handles its own configuration requests.

All data sources must have this functionality to work with GrIDS. A “wrapper” program may be written to manage software not written specifically for GrIDS. The wrapper must manage the software appropriately and present a compliant interface to GrIDS.

5.4.2 Data Source To Aggregator Communication

Reports from the data source modules are sent to the Aggregators asynchronously via TCP. Each data source module reports to one Aggregator, while an Aggregator gathers information from one or more data source modules.

The host name and port number of the appropriate Aggregator are specified in a data source module's state variables. The state variables are set initially from the config file at the startup time of the module.

Each data source module has a set of state variables that control the amount and type of reports to be sent to the Aggregator. For example, a Sniffer module might have a state variable called FROM HOST. When the variable is assigned with the value of a certain host, rainier say, the sniffer would report only those connections initiated by rainier.

Data sources communicate with their Aggregator using the general GrIDS Common Packet Format (GCPF) described in chapter 3. The GCPF header for all data source to messages is r for REPORT. The format for the body of a REPORT message are expressed in DOT format. For example, a host is represented as a node, a connection is represented as an edge, and attributes could be attached to the nodes and edges. Refer to chapter 3.1 for details about representing information in the DOT format. REPORTS are passed as strings through the TCP connections.

5.5 Initialization of Modules

When launching a new task, the Module Controller will pass it a command-line argument indicating the pathname of its initialization/config file (which may or may not be unique to this task), the path prefix of its unique control files, plus optional additional args (e.g., department ID).

The new Module will construct the exact pathnames of its unique control files (command, status response, and
log_debug files) by appending a known set of suffixes to the
given prefix.
Chapter 6

Control of Software

6.1 Overview

Chapter 5 describes the design and operation of the GrIDS Module Controller. The Module Controller provides the functions required to start, stop, reconfigure and query all GrIDS modules running on its particular host. No provision exists within the Module Controller, however, for control of the multiple process deployed across a variety of machines comprising a department within the GrIDS hierarchy. Managing the control of software across multiple machines must be done to ensure a consistent set of state variables between related GrIDS modules. Additionally, deployment of the GrIDS system on large networks will require a scalable software management scheme. To meet both these requirements the GrIDS system includes the Software Manager module.

This chapter describes the GrIDS Software Manager and how it is used to control the distributed GrIDS software system. This chapter builds on the mechanisms described in the module controller library (chapter 5), and is also closely tied in with organizational hierarchy (chapter 4). In particular, the reader will need a sense of an organization as a tree of departments, as described in that chapter, and also in the Introduction (chapter 1).

When the user wants to see what software is executing where, the GUI shows her a structured list of hosts and sub-departments in the department, along with what software is executing on the host/subdepartment and what software it can run but is not currently running, along with options to turn on or off the software.

If the user chooses to do so, then a request is sent to the Module Controller on the host, which then starts up or turns off the appropriate software. It is the process by which such requests are handled that is described in this chapter.

The software that the user sees and controls through these mechanisms includes:

- graph aggregators
- GrIDS data sources (i.e. sniffers, TCP wrappers)
- point IDSs
- Departmental Software Managers (described below)

However, we use the same mechanisms to mediate access to any variables that are settable via the module controller library mechanisms of chapter 5.

6.2 Software Managers

A software manager runs for each department, and handles requests originating from the interfaces. These requests involve starting up and shutting down software that is executing, returning lists of what software is and is not running, and changing parameters of running software.

The software manager also keeps track of hosts that are currently not responding to GrIDS messages. It knows not to include them in actions that are taken (to avoid delays while the protocols time out), but it probes them on a regular basis to see if they have come up again.

Software managers listen on a given port (which the organizational hierarchy software knows about) for requests. Note that there may be more than one software manager running on a given host if more than one domain is “headquartered” there, so a single global port cannot be used.

6.3 Access Control

Certain transactions are initiated by a User Interface in direct conversation with a Software Manager. In such cases, the Software Manager mediates human access control.

In other cases, a Module Controller may be contacted by some entity claiming to be a Software Manager, on behalf of some unknown user. To ensure that such transactions are authorized, the Module Controller performs machine access control, based on the Host:Port of the alleged Software Manager from whom it received the command.

6.3.1 User Access Control

The software manager for a department maintains a human access control list, specifying the operations that can be performed on its hosts and subdepartments by particular users. (The initial implementation will not support explicit revocation of some access capability.) Each entry of the list is a pair as follows,
(user_id, Operation)

User_id uniquely identifies a GrIDS user. Operation is the capability either to Read or to Write State Variables everywhere within the subtree rooted at that department.

The access control list of a software manager inherits the access control lists from all its ancestor software managers in the “Software Manager Hierarchy”. Hence, the access control list of a software manager consists of two parts: the inherited access control list (i_acl), and the local access control list (l_acl). The relationship between the access control lists of a software manager (P) and its immediate child software manager (C) is shown as follows,

\[ acl(C) = i_acl(P) \cup l_acl(P) \cup l_acl(C) \]

Any change to the acl of a software manager is propagated to each of the l_acl of the descending software managers. For example, removing an entry in the l_acl of a software manager results in removing that entry in the l_acl of all the descending software managers ... unless that entry also was inherited by the software manager from whose l_acl it was just removed. (In this scheme, we do not allow children to revoke capabilities they have inherited from their ancestors.)

### 6.3.2 Machine Access Control

Most commands are intended for “ordinary” GrIDS modules. A Module Controller will allow only its own parent Software Manager to access (via GET or SET) StateVars on an ordinary module. But 2 types of special modules require different access control.

If a module is a Software Manager or an Aggregator, then it may be running on behalf of another department – ie, not the dept on whose host it is headquartered. In that case, an Aggregator should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own dept’s Software Manager, and a Software Manager should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own Software Manager parent. In general, these may be different from the local Module Controller’s Software Manager parent.

Thus, each instance of an Aggregator or Software Manager must be associated with an ACL specifying which Host:Port is allowed to reconfigure or shut it down. (The initial implementation will allow an ACL to contain only a single Host:Port. This should be sufficient.)

The Module Controller will check that ACL before allowing Write access to an Aggregator. The Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent is implicitly granted Read access to every module running on that host.

### 6.4 Trust Issues for Software Managers

Each Software Manager has its own self-settable StateVars (ie, not accessible by the Module Controller):

- parent Software Manager (Host:Port)
- child Software Managers (list of Host:Port)
- child Module Controllers (list of Host:Port)
- (Host:Port) of Aggregator for our dept
- (Host:Port) of Module Controller for the above Aggregator
- Inherited ACL (human IDs)

A local configuration file contains those last 5 items for persistent storage. On wakeup, a Software Manager needs to confirm its place in the Organizational Hierarchy, and update any cached info that may be stale. It should not risk passing on any stale info to what may or may not be its children (hence its configuration file only stores those last 5 items), nor should it waste bandwidth by sending “unbuffered” info.

Therefore, a new Software Manager first contacts the Organizational Hierarchy Server and presents its department ID. If the Software Manager has an invalid department ID, or if somehow that department already has a different Software Manager, then the Organizational Hierarchy Server tells the new Software Manager to die. The Organizational Hierarchy Server should make a note of strange incidents like this in its log file.

Otherwise, the Organizational Hierarchy Server tells the new Software Manager its:

- parent Software Manager (Host:Port)
- child Software Managers (list of Host:Port)
- child Module Controllers (list of Host:Port)
- (Host:Port) of Aggregator for our dept
- (Host:Port) of Module Controller for the above Aggregator

The Software Manager then waits (this timeout should be implemented as a separate StateVariable) to be contacted by its parent, from whom it receives a single catenation of its ancestors’:

- Inherited ACL (human IDs)
It then contacts each child Software Manager, and propagates both Local and Inherited ACLs. If some child Software Managers do not respond soon enough (a different timeout State Variable), it marks those child Software Managers as presumed down, and appends those transactions to its “pending” file.

Note that upon wakeup, before a Software Manager can connect to the Organizational Hierarchy Server, it might receive a connection from someone claiming to be its parent. In this case, the Software Manager should accept an Inherited ACL from the alleged parent. However, it should not pass that data on to its own children until it can connect to the Organizational Hierarchy Server and confirm the identity of its alleged parent.

Next, the Software Manager performs an uptime/liveness check of its child hosts. At some safe place in its main loop, the Software Manager checks whether it has recently (yet another timeout Variable) polled the Module Controller of each child to see if it is alive. If appropriate, it polls them again. It then attempts to process the “pending” transactions stored in its file, if any of the intended recipients are currently alive.

6.5 Trust Issues for Module Controllers

At startup, the Module Controller reads its own configuration files to determine:

- parent Software Manager (Host:Port)
- Aggregator to whom Grids Modules report (Host:Port of Aggregator itself)
- Organizational Hierarchy Server (Host:Port)
- timeout period (to wait for local modules to respond to reconfigs)

The uptime/liveness protocol between a Module Controller and its parent Software Manager may be initiated by either party. Each party should identify itself, and assert its kinship relationship with the other. This protocol may cause a Module Controller to question its parentage (rightly or wrongly). If a Module Controller believes an unauthorized Software Manager parent is trying to claim it, or if its overtures are rejected by its purported parent, then the Module Controller should contact the Organizational Hierarchy Server. This method will handle cases where a host (and its Module Controller) is down, and misses the notification that it is being moved to a different department (Software Manager), and henceforth should obey commands from a different parent Software Manager.

The Module Controller has two special configuration files: One contains commands to invoke (potentially multiple) instances of certain programs, with appropriate parameters (some of those parameters may be variables, e.g., all dumb Data Sources must be given the Host:Port of this department’s Aggregator). This configuration file is writable by the Module Controller, since it represents a dynamically changing sequence of tasks the Module Controller should execute each time it awakens.

The Module Controller can read – but not write – its second special config file. This file contains patterns that constrain what can appear in the first special configuration file. In this manner, we can ensure that pathnames and parameters in the first configuration file comprise “safe” commands, yet also allow the Module Controller to dynamically invoke new instances of programs.

(The Module Controller also needs a file to store the PIDs corresponding to running Grids programs. It is not sufficient to store these in RAM, because whenever the Module Controller awakens, it must ascertain whether some of its children are still alive, to avoid invoking redundant instances of those tasks. This file should also store the names/locations of the configuration files corresponding to those tasks, and the department ID that “owns” each task.)

Initially, a Module Controller might startup both Aggregators and Software Managers, and each will read configuration info from its own file(s). From its file(s) or parameters, an Aggregator will learn the Host:Port of its parent Aggregator, and of its departmental Software Manager. A Software Manager will learn (via configuration files or parameters) the ID of the department it represents, and will contact the Organizational Hierarchy Server to learn the Host:Port of its parent Software Manager.

Thus, initially, various Module Controllers will correctly startup all Software Managers via this method.

The main loop of the Module Controller receives a TCP connection, decodes the incoming command, decides whether to allow access (based on the source Host:Port), processes the command, responds to the sender, and closes the connection. Most commands are intended for “ordinary” Grids modules. A Module Controller will allow only its own parent Software Manager to access (via GET or SET) StateVars on an ordinary module. But 2 types of special modules require different access control.

If a module is a Software Manager or an Aggregator, then it may be running on behalf of another department – i.e., not the dept on whose host it is headquartered. In that case, an Aggregator should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own dept’s Software Manager, and a Software Manager should trust commands from the Host:Port of its own Software Manager parent. In general, these may be different from the local Module Controller’s Software Manager parent.

Thus, each instance of an Aggregator or Software Manager must be associated with an ACL specifying which Host:Port is allowed to reconfigure or shut it down. (The initial implementation will allow an ACL to contain only a single Host:Port. This should be sufficient.)

The Module Controller will check that ACL before allowing Write access to an Aggregator. The Module Controller’s own
Software Manager parent is implicitly granted Read access to every module running on that host.

It is the responsibility of a Module Controller to perform this enhanced access-control checking when it receives commands directed at an Aggregator module. Thus, to perform authorized reconfiguration of a resident-alien Aggregator, the Module Controller must be able to read (and write) a file containing the Aggregator's ACL.

In contrast, since a Software Manager will reconfigure itself, it performs the access-control check itself (the Module Controller is not involved in the protocol at all). Although the local Module Controller does not need to read a resident-alien Software Manager’s ACL file, it does need read access to certain info in the Software Manager’s configuration file.

This is because a Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent has the “right” to inventory all modules running within its domain. Hence the Module Controller needs read access to configuration files of resident-alien Aggregators and Software Managers, so it can determine who they represent. (This capability allows a Module Controller to return a helpful error message if a User Interface tries to delete its host, and a foreign Software Manager is headquartered on it.) Note that a Module Controller’s own Software Manager parent is not allowed write or shutdown access to a resident-alien Aggregator or Software Manager that is already running.

[This schema allows inconsistent reads under certain race conditions, where a Module Controller is reading a resident-alien Software Manager’s configuration while that Software Manager is reconfiguring itself via its own TCP connection. We believe this problem is minor, and can be ignored initially.]

Finally, who should be authorized to start a new Software Manager or Aggregator dynamically? A Module Controller should obey incoming commands from its own departmental Software Manager to start a new Aggregator or Software Manager. (These commands will be SETs directed at the Module Controller itself, to which its parent Software Manager implicitly has Write access. These commands will specify the Host:Port for future access-control to that newly started special module.) But after launch, write-access to a new Aggregator or Software Manager should be allowed only from whatever Host:Port was specified in its startup command (and stored in its ACL file). In this manner, a native Software Manager authorizes the residency of a foreign module. (By setting strict constraints on the invocation parameters of a Software Manager in the special configuration file, a department can prevent certain foreign departments from headquartering their Software Managers or Aggregators on its host.)

6.6 IMPLICATIONS for GET/SET FORMAT

Because multiple instances of the “same” program (Aggregator or Software Manager) may be running on the same host, how do we tell the Module Controller which instance of a module to read or reconfigure?

This situation could arise for multiple Aggregators (GET and SET), and for multiple Software Managers (GET only; their reconfiguration does not involve the local Module Controller.)

We could continue using the previous GET/SET format: SET-ing an Aggregator could distinguish between multiple Aggregators via the HOST:PORT that initiated the reconfig command. If the ACL for an Aggregator only has a single value, then this method will work ok. GET commands could be applied to all instances of the relevant module (either Aggregators or Software managers).

Alternatively, the GET/SET command could specify the port or the home department ID of a particular multi-instance module. The Module Controller would need to learn (presumably from the modules’ configuration files) which port or home department ID corresponded to which instance (PID) of a multi-instance module.

6.7 IMPLICATIONS for Ruleset Updating

For Software Manager of dept C to update C’s Aggregator, it is not sufficient to know the Aggregator’s Host:Port (to which Grids reports are sent by C’s children). Instead, to SET StateVars on C’s Aggregator, C’s Software Manager needs to know the Port for the Module Controller at which C’s Aggregator resides. (Generally this Port will be the same on all hosts ... but not necessarily, especially as we scale up!)

The Organizational Hierarchy schema already requires that for each host, it stores the Port of its Module Controller. Moreover, the initial wakeup procedure for a Software Manager specifies that one item it will receive from the Organizational Hierarchy Server is the Host:Port of the Module Controller that controls its Aggregator.

Since presumably Rulesets change more frequently than the Organizational Hierarchy, the Software Manager should cache that Host:Port, from its most recent dial with the Organizational Hierarchy Server.

Humans will attempt to ensure that all Module Controllers occupy the same known port on all hosts. This value will be loaded by hand into each host node in the Organizational Hierarchy file. When a Module Controller must occupy a non-standard port, it is the responsibility of human operators manually to update the Organizational Hierarchy file to reflect that situation.

It is possible (though unlikely) that a Module Controller may change Ports, eg, perhaps its host dies, and upon restart, it awakens to find that its previous port has been taken by some other process. Any Software Manager needing to contact that Module Controller must assume it resides on the previously-cached port, and send its message there. (The node for a host at the Organizational Hierarchy server does
not carry info about which Aggregators may be running on that host. So unless someone does an exhaustive search after a human manually updates the port of a Module Controller, the Organizational Hierarchy Server cannot know to update a Software Manager if/when its Aggregator’s Module Controller changes Ports.)

If the Software Manager fails to receive an ACK from the Module Controller before the timeout, then the Software Manager should contact the Organizational Hierarchy server and ask for the correct (changed) Port for the Module Controller at that host.

### 6.8 Deleting Hosts Running Critical Modules

When a host is to be deleted, we already specified this operation should fail (with an informative error message) if the host is running any Aggregator or Software Manager. Thus, the Module Controller must know every GrIDS module it is running, including resident-aliens. Because the Module Controller has *implicit* Read-access to resident-aliens’ configuration files, this allows the Module Controller to inform a User Interface whose Aggregator is causing an error in response to a host-delete command.

### 6.9 Software Control Protocol

All of these packets use the GCPF described in chapter 3. The reader will also need to be familiar with the get/set protocol described in chapter 5. All messages here use the field separation scheme detailed there.

#### 6.9.1 Set Host Variable (header *shv*)

This message tells the software manager to set a particular variable on a particular host. The host must be a member of the associated department. The fields are:

- Username
- Password
- Host Name
- Module Name
- Department ID on whose behalf the module is running
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName

#### 6.9.2 Get Host Variable (header *ghv*)

This message tells the software manager to return a particular variable on a particular host. The fields are:

- Username
- Password
- Host Name
- Module Name
- Department ID on whose behalf the module is running
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value

#### 6.9.3 Set Dept Variable (header *sdv*)

This message is used to tell the software manager to set variables that are handled in particular ways and need to be updated across the whole department, such as rulesets and access control variables. The fields are:

- Username
- Password
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
6.9.4 Get Dept Variable (header \textit{gdv})

This message is used to get summary information from the software manager. For the specified variables, the returned information will be a list of host-variable-value tuples which give the value of the variable on every host in the department. A null value for a variable name indicates that host is presently down.

- Username
- Password
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
- Value
- StateVarName
Chapter 7

The Network Monitor

Although GrIDS can use many different data sources in principle, the prototype makes extensive use of a passive network monitor based on the public domain program Tcpdump. This sniffer examines raw data packets carried within the monitored network and reports the status of communication channels between system entities (users, hosts, programs, etc.) to its aggregator. The aggregator analyzes the reports and detects patterns of communication amongst system entities that indicate misuse.

7.1 Assumptions and Design Objectives

We assume there is only one aggregator per sniffer. All packets that the sniffer cannot recognize as part of a “session” or “connection” are dropped.

We will do our best to report the current state of the network. A design goal is not to miss packets during GrIDS operation and consequently omit connection reports.

7.2 Events

An event is an abstract network occurrence. An event may consist of a single network packet or a collection of packets, but that detail is hidden by the data source from the aggregator.

We describe some types of network connections that the sniffer will monitor.

A connection is characterized by a START event, a END, and several intervening stages (events). The intermediate stages vary according to the application protocol communicating via the connection. Regardless of protocol, the sniffer should report the START, END stages of a connection. The END event may be successful or unsuccessful (error).

Note that a long delay may exist between consecutive packets that belong to an event. In some of these cases, the sniffer will recognize the same but not all packets of the event and withhold reporting of the aggregator until after all relevant packets have been observed.

To report the beginning of an event in hopes of seeing the rest of the event puts the GrIDS system in significant danger of delaying or failing detection of something critical. For example, reporting a telnet connection should not be delayed until the connection is closed and all packets have been sniffed and considered. However, individual parts of a telnet connection which require multiple packets may be appropriately reported individually, rather than as multiple packet reports.

7.3 What to sniff for

The initial three packets corresponding to a TCP handshake are aggregated into a TCP_START event. This connection is uniquely labeled with the 6-tuple (src host, src port, dst host, dst port, seq, time) where host is the hostname, port is the numeric port identifier, seq is the initial sequence number of the SYN packet from the source to the destination host, and timestamp of the initial SYN packet with respect to the sniffer's local host clock.

An important connection attribute is the protocol type. The protocol type indicates the sniffer's best guess as to the type of application or data that is carried by this TCP connection. The types we anticipate identifying include TELNET, RLOGIN, RSH, HTTP, MOUNT, NFS, UNKNOWN, etc. The sniffer recognizes different connection types using the port number of the source and destination hosts. In some instances, the sniffer may examine the first few data bytes of the connection to guess the protocol type of connection (e.g., MOUNT, NFS). The protocol type attribute is a separate attribute from the port number attribute because some services (e.g., MOUNT) do not have a standard fixed port number associated with it.

Besides the above attributes, there are some protocol dependent attributes. For instance, for RLOGIN connections, there are attributes that describe the login name of the user on the client host, the login name of the user on the server host, the client-user’s terminal type and the speed of the terminal.

The output of a sniffer includes reports of the following events: 1) Start of a TCP connection between hosts. 2) End of a TCP connection between hosts – normal close (FIN), a connection reset (RST), a timeout (TIM). 3) Start of a UDP session between a pair of hosts. 4) End of a UDP session between a pair of hosts. 5) ICMP messages.
Figure 7.1: UDP sessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>prot</th>
<th>stage</th>
<th>status</th>
<th>other attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>START</td>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>OPTNEG</td>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td>TERM SIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td>LOGIN PASSWORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ERROR</td>
<td>LOGIN PASSWORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>END</td>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>END</td>
<td>ERROR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
<td>SUCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: TELNET events.

Although UDP is not a connection oriented network protocol, agents that communicate via UDP often exchange a series of related UDP packets. We define a UDP session as the collection of UDP packets between a pair of hosts originating from the same port numbers. Packets that occur within a time window are part of the same session, and packets outside the window are treated as members of separate UDP sessions. A session's time window terminates when more than a certain amount of time, say \( \alpha \) seconds, passes without a next packet of the session coming forth. See Figure 7.1.

In the event that we have a better heuristic for determining the start and end of a UDP session (e.g., UDP packets containing NFS requests between the MOUNT and UNMOUNT transactions), the sniffer should use the better heuristic.

Each event report consists of a collection of attributes. Each attribute has a name and a value. Attributes may include the name of the source host, the IP address of the source host, the port number, and the time. All sniffer reports are edge reports.

### 7.3.1 TELNET

A TELNET connection has several stages (as shown in Figure 7.1). The stages are START, OPTION-Negotiation, AUTHENTICATION, DATA, END or RESET. Each stage is reported by the sniffer with a connection report. We describe the attributes included with each report.

(TELNET,TCP,END,SUCC) refers to the event that FIN packets were observed in both directions. (TELNET,TCP,END,ERROR) indicates that a TCP RST flag was sent in one direction. The other side of the TCP connection may continue to send data and delay acknowledgment. In any case, the sniffer reports the first RST sent in either direction without waiting for its corresponding ACK message. In event of a MOUNT connection, there are attributes that describe the user credential type (e.g., AUTH\_NONE, AUTH\_UNIX, AUTH\_DES, AUTH\_KERB), the user credential (e.g., AUTH\_UNIX and the path of the filesystem to be mounted). (TELNET,TCP,EXISTING,SUCC) refers to the event that packets of a connection are observed and the sniffer has not seen the start stage of the connection. It may happen when a sniffer is first started. A control variable, ReportPartial, is used to control whether to report this type of events.

The reports are formatted in the DOT-like graph language (see Chapter 3). Here is a report of a START event:

```plaintext
digraph sniffer {
  helvellyn.cs.ucdavis.edu -> jaya.cs.ucdavis.edu
  [ app-prot="telnet", prot="tcp", sport=1024,
    dport=23, stime =33311222, seq=12345,
    stage="start", status="succ"]; }
```

Here is a report of an END event:

```plaintext
digraph sniffer {
  helvellyn.cs.ucdavis.edu -> jaya.cs.ucdavis.edu
  [ app-prot="telnet", prot="tcp", sport=1024,
    dport=23, stime =33311222, seq=12345,
    stage="end", status="succ"]; }
```

Here is a report of a AUTH event:

```plaintext
digraph sniffer {
  helvellyn.cs.ucdavis.edu -> jaya.cs.ucdavis.edu
  [ app-prot="telnet", prot="tcp", sport=1024,
    dport=23, stime =33311222, seq=12345,
    stage="auth", status="error", login="stanifor",
    password="fuzbuzz" ]; }
```

### 7.3.2 NFS

NFS servers and clients use three protocols — PORTMAPPER (RPCBIND), MOUNT, and NFS — to access remote files. An NFS session may consist of transactions to locate the mount server (PORTMAPPER), to mount a file system (MOUNT), and to access files within a file system (NFS). The sniffer only generates reports for selected NFS transactions. The report is sent to the aggregator only after both request and reply messages are processed. The transactions that we process are listed in Figure 7.2.

(NFS\*, AUTH, ERR) reports an RPC protocol authentication failure. The user credential is also included in the report. For example, if a request to access a file is forbidden, the AUTH report includes the user credential “unix/1263/10/10” which indicates that the AUTH\_UNIX authentication scheme
with user identifier 1263, group 10, and groups 10 was the credential associated with the failed transaction.

Since the mount server process (daemon) may be located at a different port address for each host, the sniffer employs a heuristic to recognize mount protocol packets. If the first few words of a packet match the RPC header corresponding to a mount protocol procedure, the rest of packet is processed.

Similarly, the sniffer uses a heuristic to detect the access of interesting filenames by processing NFS lookups and remembering the file handles to those files. Subsequent read, write or setattr transactions on those file handles are reported. For example, the heuristic would treat any file named "passwd" as equivalent and report any accesses to it.

### 7.4 Sniffer Control Messages

The sniffer will accept control messages to 1) add/change type of packets to sniff 2) ask what the sniffer is currently sniffing for 3) start up and shut down.

The control variables for sniffers are as follows:

- **startup**: To startup a sniffer, set “startup” to TRUE.
- **shutdown**: To startup a sniffer, set “shutdown” to TRUE.

**add_endpoint_filter**: “add_endpoint_filter” specifies a particular type of connection to be reported by sniffer. It is a list of 3-tuple. Tuples are separated by “n”. Each tuple has three fields: source IP address, destination IP address, and connection type. The fields are separated by whitespace characters. The IP addresses are in full IP address, e.g., rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu. The connection types include: telnet, nfs, www, rip, and rsh. For example, if we are only interested in sniffing telnet connection from k6 to lhotse, and rsh connection from lhotse to nob, then the corresponding tuples are as follows,

```
k6.cs.ucdavis.edu lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu telnet
lhotse.cs.ucdavis.edu nob.cs.ucdavis.edu rsh
```

Note that if we want to sniff connection between two hosts, regardless of the direction of the connection, then we need to explicitly specify the two possible directions by two tuples. For example, the tuples for specifying telnet connections between rainier and k2 are,

```
rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu k2.cs.ucdavis.edu telnet
k2.cs.ucdavis.edu rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu
```

**Wildcard**, "\*\*\*", is allowed to represent any IP address or connection type. For example, to sniff any connection from rainier to sierra,

```
rainier.cs.ucdavis.edu sierra.cs.ucdavis.edu *
```

To sniff any connection, the tuple will be, "\*\*\*"

We call a list of these tuples the “wanted-connection”.

**delete_endpoint_filter**: Delete_endpoint_filter is a list of tuples separated by “n”. Each tuple specifies the connection to be removed from the “wanted-connection”. The tuple to be removed must be of exactly same form of as it is added using the “add_endpoint_filter” control variable.

**current_endpoint_filter**: It specifies a whole new list for the “wanted-connection”. The existing “wanted-connected” list is replaced by this new list.

**add_unwanted_connection**: It specifies the connections that are not to be reported. It is also a list of tuple separated by “n”, and each tuple takes the same form as those in “add_endpoint_filter” control variable. We called a list of such tuples as the “unwanted-connection”.

**delete_unwanted_connection**: It is a list of tuples to be removed from the “unwanted-connection”.

**current_neg_endpoint_filter**: It specifies a whole new list for the “unwanted-connection”.

**set_time_windows**: It specifies the time of the day to send out reports from the sniffer. It is a list of tuples separated by “n”. Each tuple has two fields: the start time of a period, and the end time of the period. For example, to have report from sniffer between 9pm to noon, and from 1pm to 5pm, set the control variable as follows,

```
9:00 12:00
13:00 17:00
```

no wildcard is allowed.
set_session_window:

It specifies the maximum length of a UDP session. NFS reports that are with the same source IP addresses and destination IP addresses, and that fall within the length are combined and reported as a single report.

set_session_gap:

It specifies minimum gap between two UDP sessions. If any two NFS reports that are with the same source IP addresses and destination IP addresses, and that are apart from each other more than the length of session gap, these two reports are regarded as two separate sessions.

7.4.1 Start Up and Shut Down

First, when a sniffer is shut down (i.e., no sniffer process is running), control messages from the module controller are silently ignored and no reports are issued.

One can start-up a sniffer by sending a control message to the module controller. To avoid reporting TCP connections and UDP sessions in progress, a sniffer uses the following strategies. The sniffer waits for packets that indicate start of TCP connections. TCP packets that belong to connections already in progress are ignored. Similarly, UDP packets are ignored for $\alpha$ seconds after the sniffer is started. Once a window of quiet time has passed, UDP packets are recognized as UDP sessions (as per the UDP session definition above).

When a sniffer shuts down gracefully (i.e., a control message from the module controller instructs it to shut down), the sniffer sends reports for each TCP or UDP connection that it is currently monitoring and that has not shut down (i.e., FIN packet or timeout window). The report states that there will not be any more reports for this connection due to a shutdown of the data source, not because the connection abruptly terminates. This message tells aggregator rulesets not to expect any more reports and enables each ruleset to clean up appropriately.

When a sniffer shuts down due to an internal fault (out of memory etc.), it should try to send a shut down message to both the module controller and to its aggregator. However, in the case of an unexpected termination of the sniffer, it will not send any messages and the module controller may have to determine that it is no longer functioning and re-activate another sniffer as necessary.

Other alternatives considered but rejected are a fault-tolerant sniffer design that checkpoints its list of monitored connections so that a subsequent invocation can continue to report on existing network connections. This approach was rejected as too complex for our prototype IDS.
Bibliography


