

# A NADIR Progress Report

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## What is NADIR?

- Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter
- Los Alamos-developed system, operational since 1990
- Accredited by the DOE
- Looks for attempted ICN intrusion and misuse
- Monitors several critical systems on LANL's network
- Uses three approaches
  - ~ automated audit record analysis
  - ~ vulnerability testing
  - ~ active probing for signs of misuse
- Processes data in near realtime
- Uses an expert system approach

## Target Network

- **The Integrated Computing Network (ICN), the main computing network at Los Alamos**
- **Consists of two separate networks; Open (Unclassified) and Secure (Classified)**
  - ~ Approximately 9000 users
  - ~ 5 Cray supercomputers (4 Y-MPs, T3D)
  - ~ Over 10,000 smaller computers and workstations
  - ~ Connects to 5 external networks (e.g., the Internet)
- **Used by both Laboratory employees and others**

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3

## Goals

- **Deterrence**
  - ~ increase difficulty in undertaking misuse
  - ~ increase perceived odds of being caught
- **Detection**
  - ~ discover act of misuse
  - ~ manage investigation
- **Accountability**
  - ~ trace activities to responsible individuals
  - ~ hold them responsible for their actions
  - ~ collect evidence suitable for prosecution

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4

## Functions

- A near realtime method by which to detect a range of security relevant events
  - ~ attempted break-ins to the ICN by outsiders
  - ~ invalid activity or abuses by insiders
- The capability for ad-hoc analysis of past ICN user activity
  - ~ useful for on-going investigations, background examinations, and audits
- Long term maintenance of a record of audit analysis
  - ~ for documenting compliance with DOE security directives

## Strategy

- Monitor selected set of critical network systems
- Do not monitor network traffic
- Currently monitors
  - ~ UNICOS Cray supercomputers
  - ~ IBM-based data archiving system (the Common File System)
  - ~ UNIX-based Kerberos (network authentication system)

## Distributed Design

- **Online - for each target system**
  - ~ target system-based client
    - pre-process audit data
    - search for signs of misuse and vulnerabilities
    - transmit data to server (push only)
  - ~ workstation-based server
    - summarize target system data into profiles
    - analyze overall system and individual user activity
    - produce reports and alarms
- **Offline - investigate anomalous users**


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## Why the Distributed Design?

- **Functional protection**
- **Isolate data analysis and alarm functions from the target systems**
- **Results in greater level of trust in the detection system**
  - ~ less opportunity for tampering by users
- **Activity correlation**
  - ~ capability to correlate activity from several target systems
  - ~ increased sensitivity to distributed misuse
- **Increased security and flexibility is well worth the cost in terms of hardware and software interface development**

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## NADIR in the Secure ICN



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9

## Profiles

- Profiles provide a statistical summary of activity on each target system
- Individual user profiles
  - ~ one for each system user
  - ~ activity that can be attributed to that user
- Composite (system) profile
  - ~ one for each system
  - ~ combination of all user activity on the system
  - ~ misuse not attributable to a single user
  - ~ vulnerable configuration information

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10

## Event Detection

- **Expert rules**
  - ~ are applied to profiled data
  - ~ describe interesting behavior
- **If behavior is found**
  - ~ one or more rules are "triggered"
  - ~ an anomaly score for user or system is set
- **Stored for each user and for the whole system**
  - ~ anomaly score
  - ~ list of rules triggered

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## Funding

- **The production NADIR has been funded entirely by LANL**
  - ~ FSS Division (S&S funding)
  - ~ CIC Division (operational funding)
- **Staffing**
  - ~ has ranged from 3 to 5 FTEs over the last six years
  - ~ currently 4 FTEs
- **Classified extension funded outside LANL**

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## General benefit

- **The electronic equivalent to a police officer patrolling a neighborhood, which provides an opportunity to**
  - ~ get an overall impression of current conditions
  - ~ spot and evaluate specific problems
  - ~ get to know the neighborhood residents
  - ~ become known in the neighborhood
- **Similarly, NADIR**
  - ~ provides a summary of network operation
  - ~ points out suspicious users and events
  - ~ creates an opportunity for security officers to meet and talk with users

## Specific benefits

- **Detects *many* more events than did manual auditing**
- **These events are detected more quickly**
- **Follow-up investigations are more timely, systematic, complete, and fully documented**
- **Event detection and investigation takes fewer personnel**
- **System has enhanced security awareness in the user community**
- **Improved understanding of how the network really works**
- **More effective, and less expensive, response to external audits and requests for special reports**

## Attack handling

- **NADIR compares individual and composite activity to typical or valid activity**
- **Attacks that require frequent repetition are detected easily**
  - ~ by comparing current usage to normal past usage
- **It also recognizes violations of computer policies**
  - ~ like improper accesses
  - ~ illegal combinations of events
- **Second order anomalies, like being repeatedly being "almost interesting", are missed**

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## False positives and negatives

- **How many false positives?**
  - ~ few enough that they can easily be investigated and eliminated by a half-time investigator
  - ~ getting fewer
  - ~ invested a considerable effort to improve detection accuracy, using automated statistical tuning over a significant period of past usage
- **False negatives are hard to prove**
  - ~ we do not know of any significant event missed by NADIR (but found by other means) since the current system was implemented

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## Tuning

- NADIR was designed and tuned for the LANL user population
- We chose NOT to implement self-learning to avoid the potential weaknesses of that method
- We pre-characterize the user population, followed by periodic re-characterizations

## Fielding the system

- Normal business constraints limit our ability to do everything we'd like to do
  - ~ i.e., we've never had the funding to all we'd like
- Development/maintenance costs are on-going and seemingly never ending
  - ~ monitored systems constantly change
  - ~ five workstations must be maintained/upgraded etc.
  - ~ resource intensive (3 to 5 developers/administrators)
- Running costs are low
  - ~ 9000 users on eight network systems are monitored
  - ~ with one half-time investigator
- We have a proven, well-functioning system

## **Further work/research**

- **Hope to advance the technology through collaboration and research funding**
- **Interested in expanding to**
  - ~ look more at Internet activity
  - ~ develop a characterization of Internet usage
- **Investigating other promising detection methodologies that LANL has used for IRS, Social Security, and credit card fraud applications**
- **Have obtained additional funding**
  - ~ one FTE and one post-doc
  - ~ currently hiring

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