# ATM Firewall Technology: Lessons for Intrusion Detection

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**Overview** 

**Problems** 

**ATM Firewall Technology** 

Lessons

## **Problems**

# **Quality of Audit Data in Large Systems**

- Level of detail vs. amount of data:
  - >compression, reduction/aggregation, deduction
- Context of data:
  - >users, connections, actions,...
- Value of data:
  - > authenticity, integrity
- E.g., IP, ATM addresses (low level access, e.g., /dev/ip)

# **Integration of Intrusion Detection and System Design**

- Design of large scale distributed systems is hard
- Getting designers to include security is harder
- Adding intrusion detection support mechanisms is \_\_\_\_\_

# **ATM Firewall Technology**

#### Goal

Develop Model for ATM Firewall Technology

Instantiation of Model (Implementation):

- Proof of concept
- Gaining practical experiences

# **Background and Definitions**

Definition Firewall Technology:

Mechanism to help enforce access policies about communication traffic entering or leaving networks.

# **ATM Technology**


- Developed for use in B-ISDN
- Switching of small fixed-length packets (cells)
- Pt-to-pt, pt-to-mpt communication
- Connection-oriented
- permanent connections: administrative mechanisms
- switched connections: connection establishment protocol
- Quality of service guarantees

#### **IP over ATM**

Interesting case for the purpose of this workshop session:

- ATM: spans local-wide area networks systems
- ATM: still room for standard improvement
- IP: legacy system baggage


# **Example**



# **Assumptions**

- Connection oriented character of communication
- Secure public key infrastructure, name service
- Secure binding between principals and keys
- Integrity of trusted computing base
- Strength of cryptographic algorithms

#### **Reference Model**



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#### **Essential Elements**

- Endpoint authentication
- Domain based call admission control
- Connection authentication (authenticity and integrity)
- Audit
- Centralized policy with distributed service and enforcement

#### **Contributions**

- Concept of firewall technology is viable in connectionoriented highspeed networks
- Five elements are essential for a reference model of firewall technology
- Few additions to signaling protocol and system are necessary and sufficient for implementation

## Lessons

# (Quality of Audit Data)

## 1.) Authenticity

- Lack of authenticity see ATM firewall architecture
- Context establishment problem security context
- Level of detail e.g., information elements

# (Integration of ID and System Design)

## 2.) Functional Dependencies

Between authentication and access control

Between audit and all other security services!

Now, who acts accordingly?

#### 3.) Prevention vs. Detection/Recovery

There should be no tension between *prevention* and *detection* 

There should be an integrated approach, where

- Preventive mechanisms operate under the assumption that they will fail in certain circumstances
- Preventive mechanisms should provide as much help for detection mechanisms as possible

#### 4.) Intrusion Detection List of Mechanisms

What basic *mechanisms* are necessary (e.g., audit; secure, reliable communication)?

Make certain this list becomes second nature for system designers.

#### 5.) Motivation for Businesses

Leverage off advantages for other industries

- Telecommunication carriers want nonpudiable billing information
- Identical mechanisms required for billing and ID

Pay close attention to justifying our case not for the sake of ID alone, but also different business needs that can be fulfilled.