GLOBAL GUARD MEETING
December 8, 1998
3085 ENG II
9:00 - 10:00
In attendance:
Karl Levitt (KL), David Klotz (DK), David O'Brien (DOB), and Jeff Rowe
(JR)
TOPICS
PI Meeting Presentation Ideas
Paprika Attack
Additional Ideas for Global Guard
For Next Week’s PI Meeting
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PI Meeting Presentation Ideas
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KL: Viewgraphs and scenarios with correlation
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David O'Brien explains CIDF and potential direction for Global Guard
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DOB has concerns about:
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Yemini model – how many attacks it can detect
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Can’t express everything in terms of SEMS
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Build in Tripwire
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A problem with a single symptom creates a disconnected graph
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Global Guard take CIDF view; make Smart Event Management System (SEMS),
detect XYZ attack in SEMS model
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Augment SEMS for intrusion detection and response
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Codebook
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Paprika Attack
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DOB: Linux machine attacked causing network performance problems: response
times were slow, packets were missing caused by hackers overloading the
routers
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SEMS would have misdiagnosed the problem as congested routers or a bad
router card
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JR: Use sniffer, profile people’s traffic?
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DOB: Set threshold: Machines using 80% bandwidth over 10 minute period.
Our collision rates are too high.
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Causality Chain leads to codebook. What is there is a problem that doesn’t
have any redundancy in its symptoms?
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DOB: Use SEMS for things with a "natural fit."
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Will have to augment some problems
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Modeling language
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KL: Correlation attacks – formulate using SEMS?
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JR: Still use codebook approach to correlation
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Additional Ideas for Global Guard
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DOB: Correlation Aggregation
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Upper level A-Box to take in data sources
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A-box tripwire
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Aggregate codebook in Global Guard
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To reduce false positives, use multiple IDS
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For Next Week’s PI Meeting
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Roughly encode with SEMS by Friday
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Scenario à Causality Graph à
Codebook
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Spend 5 minutes talking about why we need correlation
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SEMS – faster at rulesets than GrIDS because of the codebook
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SEMS has optimization
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GrIDS can’t do aggregation
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Codebook correlations and correlation of the correlations
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KL: Permutation matrix – redundancy level now, need for error detection
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Models
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Model generic attacks – network, host, DOS, protocol based (SYN-FLOOD)
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Multistage attack, coordinated attacks, distributed attacks
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DK: Model symptoms
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Model Attackers
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Certain symptoms he can change
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What symptoms he can make us see
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Attacker can make attack look like a network problem
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Attacker misleads – different host
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Access IDS vulnerabilities based on attacks
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Embellish Paprika attack
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Piecing together attacks – hierarchical problem.